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Abstract
Under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) current dispute settlement system (DSS) the
utmost threat to a non-complying offender of a trade agreement is posed by the retaliation of
the victorious complainant. Several scholars argue that the smaller and poorer a country is,
the more difficult a country finds it to implement retaliatory measures and to bear the costs
of a lawsuit. Hence, it may be conjectured that this retaliation based enforcement exhibits a
disadvantage for smaller and poorer countries who seek to enforce a larger trading partner’s
compliance. Moreover, larger and wealthier countries may anticipate their less powerful trading
partners’ inability to retaliate effectively. The issue is taken up in a tripartite analysis of this
dissertation.
Initially, an empirical chapter explores the link between a country’s economic power and its
participation in the WTO’s DSS. Therefore, a simple sequential game of dispute settlement is
employed in order to set the stage for a binary regression model. The regression uses an array of
variables of economic power to explain a country’s decision whether or not to file a complaint.
The results show that a country is more likely to file a complaint if (i) it has a high income,
(ii) its trading partner has a low income, (iii) the trade value of the commodity at stake is
significant, and (iv) its retaliatory capacity is substantial.
The subsequent chapter sets up a two country model in order to analyze the comparative
static effects of a reduction in litigation costs. The results are mixed. While the compliance
of less powerful countries may be improved, more powerful countries may be led to committing
even more severe offenses than before.
i
Another proposal for reform suggests to allow retaliatory rights to be traded between coun-
tries. The effects of this proposal are analyzed in Chapter 4 (joint work with Mathis Klepper)
by means of a three country model. The results show that tradable retaliation is able to im-
prove WTO members’ compliance with their trade policy commitments, especially towards less
powerful trading partners.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
“I believe that trade opening and reducing trade barriers, has been, is and will remain, essential
to promote growth and development, to improve standards of living and to tackle poverty reduc-
tion.”
Pascal Lamy (2008), Director-General of the WTO.
The belief that trade offers gains to those who do trade is at the heart of the WTO’s endeavors
to reduce trade barriers. If this is true, why do countries impose trade barriers at all?
Krugman (1991), page 25, observes “three simple rules” on the objectives of an individual
member country in trade negotiations, which he calls “GATT-think”:
“(1) Exports are good.
(2) Imports are bad.
(3) Other things equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is good.”
Krugman argues that GATT-think is, “[...] to an economist, nonsense.” However, he admits
that although it “[...] is very wrong, yet somehow turns out mostly right.“ 1
1The last quotation refers to page 27 of Krugman (1991).
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There are indeed economic reasons for why a country would want to impose import barriers.
Market power is one of them. If a country has a large share in the world market demand
for a particular good, this country may increase its welfare by imposing import barriers. The
associated reduction in demand leads to a decreasing world market price of the imported good.
This in turn leads c.p. to an improvement of the country’s terms of trade and thus to an increase
in its welfare.
Distributional motivation provides another reason for opposition against free trade. A coun-
try is able to increase its welfare by imposing import barriers if it attributes a sufficiently higher
value either to the surplus of its domestic producers of import substitutes or to its tariff revenue
than it attributes to domestic consumers’ surplus.
Given that it may be individually rational, especially for a large country, to implement
trade barriers and thus to reduce global welfare, the focus of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the WTO, is to provide a set of rules that helps its 153
members to reduce trade barriers.2 However, any bilateral trade agreement is only sustainable
if defection can be deterred. This is where the DSS of the WTO comes into operation. Under
the DSS, any member country may file a complaint against a trading partner that supposedly
violated a trade agreement. If the arbitration panel of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
finds the disputable trade measure to constitute an infringement, it will ask the offender to
bring its trade policy into agreement with the rules. If the offender fails to do so, the DSB may,
according to Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), entitle the victorious
complainant to impose retaliatory trade barriers against the offender. Since the WTO does not
possess supranational sovereignty, the DSB is unable to impose penalties or fines on the non-
complying offender. Hence, it is its trading partner’s retaliation that poses the utmost threat
to an offender of a trade agreement. Obviously, the magnitude of this threat to one trading
partner depends upon the other trading partner’s ability to impose retaliation. As a matter of
fact, smaller and poorer countries find it hard to implement retaliatory import barriers without
2As of September 29, 2008, the WTO counts 153 members.
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harming their own welfare either because these countries cannot influence world market prices,
or because they lack domestic substitutes for their imports.3 This enforcement flaw of smaller
and poorer countries is likely to be anticipated by their trading partners, resulting in the latter’s
reluctance to comply with panel rulings.4 Anticipation may even start one step earlier, deterring
smaller and poorer countries from filing a complaint in the first place. This in turn would lead
to systematically more offenses against smaller and poorer countries than against wealthier and
larger countries.
In other words, there is reason to conjecture that a country’s economic power influences its
decision whether or not to commit an offense and whether or not to file a complaint. Conse-
quently, the DSS raises important questions about the repercussions of this power based enforce-
ment and about the desirability of certain proposals for reform. Although a lot of the discussion
on the DSS is led by scholars with a background in law or political sciences, these questions are
particularly interesting and suitable for economic analysis. In the course of this dissertation the
following questions are addressed: Is there evidence in support of the hypothesis that smaller
and poorer countries are deterred from filing complaints? Which role do litigation costs play
in a country’s decision whether or not to file a complaint, and which role do they play in a
country’s decision whether or not to commit an offense? How would countries’ behavior change
if the right to retaliate became tradable, as proposed by the Permanent Mission of Mexico to
the WTO?
1.2 Outline
This Introduction (Chapter 1) is completed by a brief overview of the related literature. It is
followed by the three main chapters, which form the central contributions of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 starts with an empirical analysis of the DSS’ usage. The aim of this chapter is to
3Anderson (2002) is among the first economic papers to make this point.
4The problem of non-implementation of panel rulings is highlighted by Choi (2007), who argues that, especially
in cases which involve poor country complainants, the threat of retaliation does not create a sufficient incentive
to enforce violating countries’ compliance with their commitments.
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investigate a potential link between a country’s decision of whether or not to file a complaint
and its economic power. Therefore, a simple sequential game of dispute settlement is employed
in order to set the stage for a binary regression model. The regression uses an array of variables
of economic power to explain a country’s decision whether or not to file a complaint. The results
show that a country is more likely to file a complaint if (i) it has a high income, (ii) its trading
partner has a low income, (iii) the trade value of the commodity at stake is significant, and (iv)
its retaliatory capacity is substantial.
Chapter 3 uses a theoretical two country model in order to investigate the equilibria of a tariff
setting game under the current rules of the DSS. The focus of the analysis is on the comparative
static effects of a proposed reduction in litigation costs. The results show that a reduction in
litigation costs exhibits a trade off. While the cost reduction is able to improve the compliance
of less powerful countries, some more powerful countries are led to committing even more severe
offenses than before.
Chapter 4 (joint work with Mathis Klepper) employs a theoretical three country model
to analyze the reform proposal of tradable retaliatory rights, that has been suggested by the
Permanent Mission of Mexico to the WTO. The analysis shows that tradable retaliation is able
to improve WTO members’ compliance with their trade policy commitments, especially towards
less powerful trading partners.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the preceding chapters’ results, discusses policy implications
and points towards future research approaches.
1.3 Related Literature
A broad field of literature on the WTO and its predecessor GATT covers various aspects of these
organizations such as membership, the composition of trade flows, the interaction with regional
trade agreements, China’s accession, and the perceived areas of conflict between developing and
developed countries, which are protectionism in agriculture and textiles and the inclusion of
labor and production standards.
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However, only a rather narrow field of literature deals explicitly with aspects of trade disputes
and the DSS. If one disregarded case studies that deal with a particular dispute in a merely
descriptive way, only very few theoretical and empirical studies remain, that investigate the
systemic aspects of trade disputes and WTO dispute settlement.
One particular branch of theoretical literature examines the question under which circum-
stances a country prefers an equilibrium in which countries set their unilateral optimal tariffs to
an equilibrium of free trade for reasons other than redistributive motivations. Johnson (1953)
finds that a country prefers a tariff war equilibrium to free trade if its import demand is suf-
ficiently price-elastic relative to the price-elasticity of its trading partner’s import demand.
Another two country model by Kennan and Riezman (1988) features differences in countries’
endowments. The authors show that a country whose endowment is sufficiently large prefers a
tariff war to free trade. Following up, Syropoulos (2002) employs a two country Heckscher-Ohlin
model where countries differ in their population. Paralleling Kennan and Riezman’s results, Sy-
ropoulos shows that a country whose population is sufficiently large prefers a tariff war to free
trade. Melatos et al. (2007) find that a country may even prefer a tariff war to free trade
if only domestic consumers’ utility features a sufficiently large elasticity of substitution. As a
summary, these studies suggest that, when countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect
to their endowments, population, preferences, etc., one country may actually prefer the tariff
war equilibrium and would not want to arrive at a free trade equilibrium even if this could be
achieved hypothetically. However, a tariff war equilibrium implies a deadweight loss, that could
potentially be avoided if asymmetric countries were able to negotiate trade agreements with
(asymmetric) tariff commitments, reflecting their individual threat points. Hence, for a country
whose best response has been to play its unilateral optimal tariff in a setting without the pos-
sibility of contracting, this may not be a best response anymore when countries can embark on
negotiations and credibly commit themselves to these.
The finding that negotiations on trade agreements between countries may entail different
optimal tariffs is examined by another branch of theoretical literature. Bagwell and Staiger
5
(1999) and (2002) show that those unilateral optimal tariffs which are set in the absence of an
agreement are inefficiently high in a framework where countries can negotiate reciprocal tariff
liberalization. The authors find that the WTO’s fundamental principle of reciprocity is able
to neutralize a country’s incentive to influence its terms of trade in its favor since the relative
world market price of imports to exports does not change when reciprocal tariff liberalization
occurs. In other words, in a bilateral model of trade there are several pairs of import tariffs that
induce the same terms of trade. If countries can be forced to stick to their tariff commitments,
they will chose a lower pair of import tariffs as compared to the non-cooperative outcome,
thus increasing global welfare. A recent paper by Epifani and Vitaloni (2006) uses the two
country setup that was proposed by Kennan and Riezman (1988) in order to investigate whether
Bagwell and Staiger’s finding holds as well in the case of asymmetric countries. Epifani and
Vitaloni compare the countries’ welfare under unrestricted Nash-bargaining solutions over their
bilateral tariffs to Nash-bargaining solutions that fulfill the reciprocity condition. They find
“[...] that the negotiated outcome under reciprocity, in addition to being inefficient, is also
unequal, since it gives the weak country a lower utility than at the unconstrained Nash-bargaining
solution.”5 Yet another caveat of the Bagwell and Staiger approach is highlighted by the authors
themselves. Bagwell and Staiger (1999), page 224, note that their model requires the external
assumption of enforceability. This is a crucial condition since without the possibility of credible
tariff commitments, countries would fall back to the tariff war equilibrium. Bown (2002) uses
a two country tariff setting game where the producers’ surpluses of each country’s import-
competing industry enter the governments welfare functions weighted by a political economy
parameter. Countries experience positive shocks in their political economy parameters and
thus seek to raise their import tariffs, choosing between a “legal route” and an “illegal route”.6
While the legal route foresees using safeguards and compensating the other country for the loss of
market access, the illegal route foresees raising tariffs without compensation and consequently
triggering retaliation via the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Bown shows that a country
5Epifani and Vitaloni (2006), page 438.
6Bown (2002), page 297.
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prefers the illegal route “[...] when it has the capacity to take advantage of its own terms of
trade gains and when its trading partners do not have the potential to impose terms of trade
losses through retaliation.”7
As a summary, theoretical studies on trade disputes and the WTO dispute settlement system
agree in their finding that a country may face a disadvantage in enforcing its trading partner’s
compliance when it is “weaker” than its trading partner. That is, when a country has a lower
ability to influence the terms of trade or when its welfare function implies a lower optimal
import tariff as compared to its trading partner’s. Consequently, some proposals have been
made that aim at strengthening the weaker countries’ position in the dispute settlement sys-
tem. These proposals include multilateral retaliation, direct penalties, financial compensation,
tradable retaliation and a reduction of litigation costs.
The effects of multilateral retaliation in the WTO are analyzed by Maggi (1999). The author
constructs a three country model of trade where each country is a net importer from its right
neighbor and a net exporter to its left neighbor. Maggi considers import tariffs as a country’s
control variable, such that a country could be tempted to impose a tariff on imports from its
right neighbor since the volume of targeted imports is relatively large compared to the volume of
exports that could potentially be subject to a retaliatory tariff. Maggi compares the system’s sta-
tus quo of unilateral enforcement to a system that allows for multilateral enforcement. Maggi’s
model “[...] suggests that a multilateral approach to enforcement and rule-making is particularly
important when there are strong power imbalances in bilateral trading relationships.”8
In a recent paper, Klimenko et al. (2008) analyze the effects of direct penalties on the
enforceability of trade agreements. Klimenko et al. (2008) build on the Johnson (1953) model
to set up a repeated game of tariff negotiations. They find that a dispute settlement system
that uses direct penalties is able to render countries’ tariff commitments credible, thus leading
to a cooperative equilibrium.9
7Bown (2002), page 314.
8Maggi (1999), page 209.
9The authors assume that the payment of the penalty is voluntary, but that if the offending country fails to pay
it, then the dispute cannot be resolved and the repeated game will continue in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
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Limao and Saggi (2006) consider the possibility of financial compensation. In their model
the authors assume that the volume of trade between each pair of trading countries is covered by
bonds that are posted by each government in order to serve as collateral. In different versions of
their model they assume either that these bonds are exchanged bilaterally between the trading
countries or that these bonds are held by a third country. Limao and Saggi show that if bonds
were posted with third countries, a country’s compliance would improve even if countries differed
in size or market power.
The importance of third party enforcement is highlighted as well in the paper of Bagwell et
al. (2007), which provides an analysis of the Mexican proposal of tradable retaliation.10 The
authors find that if a violated country is allowed to auction off the retaliatory right, its trading
partner’s compliance with its trade policy commitments may improve.11
Some experts argue that the costs that go along with the preparation of a complaint have
a more pronounced adverse effect on weaker and less developed countries than on economically
more powerful and higher developed countries. Bown (2005), Bush and Reinhardt (2003) as
well as Guzman and Simmons (2005) argue that poorer countries may have less “legal capacity”
than richer countries. However, since legal services are internationally traded, even a poor
country may extend its legal capacity by hiring law firms or consultancies to prepare a complaint.
Nevertheless, even if one adopted this view, poorer countries would face variable costs that would
deter them from filing a complaint, while wealthier countries would have sunk their litigation
costs by running a well-staffed trade mission. Consequently, another policy recommendation,
that has been made by Footer (2001), is to reduce litigation costs.
On the empirical side there is evidence both for and against the theorists’ view that the
dispute settlement system favors more powerful countries.
Horn et al. (1999) show that a model, in which countries encounter random violations
10See Permanent Mission of Mexico to the WTO (2002) for the proposal of the Mexican Mission to the WTO.
11The paper of Bagwell et al. (2007) is based on an imperfect information setup. Moreover, if one country
executes the retaliatory right, this creates a positive externality for the other countries, except for the violating
country. Thus, auction failure (no country bids for the retaliatory right) may occur if the violating country is
foreclosed from bidding. As a consequence, Bagwell et al. (2007) find that compliance is improved if and only if
the probability of auction failure is sufficiently low.
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proportionately to the diversity and value of their trade, explains the observed pattern of disputes
quite reasonably.12 Hence, Horn et al. (1999) do not take the numbers of observable disputes as
evidence of power considerations in dispute settlement. However, there is an argument against
this approach. It may be the case that the set of observable disputes constitutes only a biased
subset of all disputes. There is reason to believe that the dark figure of disputes exhibits a
pattern that differs systematically from the pattern of the observed disputes. Smaller countries
may not find it worthwhile to spend litigation costs on a complaint in anticipation of their
inability to enforce even an affirmative panel ruling. If this proved to be true, the result of
Horn et al. (1999) would have to be questioned since it would no longer mean that no power
considerations are present at all, but rather that power considerations are absent among those
countries which are powerful enough to find complaining worthwhile.
Bown (2005) proposes an approach which addresses these concerns. The author compiles a
data set of disputes, in which all victim countries that have suffered from the defendant’s offense
are known with certainty. Subsequently, Bown regresses the binary decision of whether or not
a country has filed a complaint on several country specific and dispute specific variables. All
in all, Bown’s empirical results suggest that economically small countries indeed face a severe
disincentive in complaining as opposed to economically larger countries. Allee (2008) sets up
a similar binary regression model that is based on another data set where all victim countries
that have suffered from the defendant’s offense are known with certainty as well. Although Allee
uses a different array of explanatory variables, his findings parallel the findings of Bown (2005)
in detecting a bias against less powerful countries.
Yet another empirical approach that deals with a presumed bias of the DSS’ usage is pre-
sented by Guzman and Simmons (2005). The authors address the question whether a country
of a given size rather complains against offenders of equal size or against offenders of larger size.
Guzman and Simmons (2005) interpret their results in a way that lets them deny the presence
12The underlying assumption of this class of models is that a dispute is generally undesirable for a country. In
order to be still able to explain the occurrence of disputes, a demon, which possesses policymakers from time to
time and leads them to irrational behavior, is introduced. This demon approach was established by Kovenock
and Thursby (1992).
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of power considerations.
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Chapter 2
Evidence of Power Considerations in
WTO Dispute Settlement
Abstract
The usage of the WTO’s DSS is dominated by high income countries. Since the ultimate
enforcement threat of the system is based on retaliation, countries may take their economic size
as well as their specific bilateral retaliatory capacity into account when deciding whether or
not to respond to a detrimental infringement of a trade agreement by filing a costly complaint.
Hence, various scholars conjecture that those lawsuits that surface in the record of the WTO
constitute only the biased tip of an iceberg of trade disputes. In order to investigate such a
potential bias, this chapter sets up a sequential game of the DSS. Subsequently, a binary choice
model is employed to empirically explain a country’s decision whether or not to litigate against a
trading partner. The results suggest that a country is more likely to file a complaint if (i) it has
a high income, (ii) its trading partner has a low income, (iii) the trade value of the commodity
at stake is significant, and (iv) its retaliatory capacity is substantial.
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2.1 Introduction
With the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the DSB has gained much importance as an
institution in the world trading system. While a panel’s decision in the GATT era became a
ruling only by consensus, the panel decisions under the WTO’s DSS become a ruling unless there
is a consensus against it. This modification is a candid commitment to encouraging complaints
of members that have suffered from a contract breach of their trading partners. However,
the WTO does not possess any supranational sovereignty to enforce compliance with the rules-
based trading system by imposing sanctions or fines. As a consequence, the ultimate enforcement
threat of a panel ruling is based on the retaliatory capacity of the victorious complainant. While
it may be worthwhile for an economically large country to implement authorized retaliatory
countermeasures against a trading partner, an economically small country may shoot itself in
the foot by doing so.1
An example of this discrepancy is found in the prominent Bananas Dispute (i.e. DS16 and
DS27), in which the United States of America (US) and several Latin American countries com-
plained against the bananas import regime of the European Communities (EC), which favored
bananas from the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Although the panel decided
in favor of the complainants, the EC refused to bring their import regime into compliance with
the ruling. Upon their request, Ecuador and the US were authorized to suspend concessions
to the EC as a retaliatory measure.2 In the outcome of this dispute the EC did not bring its
import regime into conformity with the rules of the WTO, the US implemented their retaliatory
measures, while Ecuador was reluctant to do so. Several experts e.g. Bronckers and van den
Broek (2005) or Subramanian and Watal (2000) agree in arguing that Ecuador was virtually
unable to implement retaliatory measures unless it would like to hurt its own economy even
1It is a well known fact that a small country’s optimal import tariff equals zero since a small country cannot
influence world market prices, i.e. it faces a completely elastic supply. In this context the terms “large” or “small”
are used synonymously to the terms “rich” and “poor” in order to capture the magnitude of a country’s gross
domestic product (GDP).
2Ecuador was authorized to suspend import concessions to the EC of an amount of 201.6 million US-Dollars
(USD), while the US were authorized to suspend concessions to the EC of an amount of 191.4 million USD.
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more.3 At the end of the day of this dispute, the EC kept the benefits of maintaining an illegal
import regime, the US got at least a little compensated for the losses in the bananas business
by the implementation of import barriers against the EC, while Ecuador was left with nothing
but an injured bananas export sector.
Such a potential inability of poorer countries to enforce an offending trading partner’s com-
pliance may render the usage of the DSS less attractive for poorer than for richer countries. This
effect may in turn show up in the data as a bias against poorer countries. Table 2.1 provides
a breakdown of all complaining and defending countries from 1995 through 2005, grouped ac-
cording to the World Bank’s income classifications.4 Clearly the figures of Table 2.1 show that
Complainant\Defendant High Upper Middle Lower Middle Low Sum
High 151 33 21 17 222
Upper Middle 28 19 12 1 60
Lower Middle 42 13 7 2 64
Low 14 5 2 1 22
Sum 235 70 42 21 368
Table 2.1: Usage of the DSS by Countries’ Income Groups from 1995 through 2005
wealthier countries filed the majority of all complaints. Moreover, these countries dominate the
system as well among the defendants. However, this observation is by no means a proof for the
claim that the DSS is biased against poorer countries.
This chapter tries to shed light on the question of what determines whether a country does
or does not file a complaint against an offending trading partner. It aims at providing a non-
random theoretical explanation that allows for rationally acting countries and can be empirically
tested. Therefore, section 2.2 sets up a game theoretic model of the dispute settlement process.
3Note that even the arbitrators of this particular case acknowledged this problem in WT/DS27/ARB/ECU,
para 177 by stating that “[...] it could be that Ecuador may find itself in a situation where it is not realistic or
possible for it to implement the suspension authorized by the DSB for the full amount of the level of nullification
and impairment estimated by us in all of the sectors and/or under all agreements mentioned above combined.”
Moreover, the arbitrators notice that the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is not prepared for such a
case in WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, para 177: “The present text of the DSU does not offer a solution for such an
eventuality.”
4The figures on the notified disputes are taken from the author’s own dataset, which is based on the record of
disputes on the WTO’s website. Income classifications of countries correspond to the World Bank’s classification
scheme.
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In section 2.3, predictions on how different observable variables should influence a country’s
decision whether or not to file a complaint are derived. Subsequently, in section 2.4, a statistical
criterion is derived and employed to create a data set of 2,409 countries that are likely to have
suffered in the course of 185 disputes on import restrictions, ranging from 1995 through 2005.
By means of a probit model, the binary complaining decision is regressed on the offender’s
and the victim’s GDP, the trade value of the disputable commodity at stake, and a proxy for
the retaliatory capacity of the victim. The results unambiguously suggest that victims do take
power considerations into account when deciding whether or not to file a complaint. Thereby
the findings of Bown (2005) are confirmed on a broader statistical basis. Section 2.7 challenges
the findings of Guzman and Simmons (2005) by using the newly compiled data set to re-estimate
a model that is similar to Guzman and Simmons’. Section 2.8 offers concluding remarks and
relates the chapter’s findings to the literature.
2.2 Game Theoretical Foundation
The handling of a dispute in the WTO occurs according to a clear-cut sequential scheme of es-
calation. The first stage foresees a consultation phase of 60 days, in which the conflicting parties
are supposed to settle their dispute in bilateral negotiations without any judge or panel. In case
the opposing parties are unable to find an agreement within these sixty days, the establishment
of a panel may be requested by either party. Once a panel has ruled on a dispute, the ruling
can be appealed by either party, so that an appellate body will consider the issue again. If
the final ruling on the dispute judges a defendant’s policy to constitute an infringement of the
WTO’s rules, the offending party’s government will be asked to bring its measures into confor-
mity. Should the offending country refuse to do so within a “reasonable period of time”, the
victorious complainant may request the retaliatory “suspension of concessions”. In practice, this
suspension of concessions may constitute for example an import tariff or a quota which targets
the complainant’s imports from the defendant. Of course, the authorized extent of retaliation is
dependant upon the magnitude of the initial offense. Formally, the DSU states that “[t]he level
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of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent
to the level of the nullification or the impairment.”5 However, in legal practice there are vari-
ous ways of how panels have interpreted this equivalence condition by calculating the authorized
amount of retaliation. Jordan (2005) provides a discussion of the employed calculation methods.
For those disputes that deal with trade in goods and violative import barriers, one particularly
dominating approach is the counterfactual trade value model.6 This model first assesses the
reduction in the trade value of the imported goods that have been subject to the defendant’s
disputable trade measure. This reduction in trade value is seen as the damage that was inflicted.
Now in turn, the victorious complainant would be entitled to implement a retaliatory import
barrier on its own imports from the defendant that leads to a trade value reduction of smaller
or equal size. In other words, the retaliatory trade value distortion must not exceed the trade
value distortion of the initial offense.
2.2.1 Setup of the Game
Settling a dispute involves a sequence of decisions. At different points in time, the complainant
and the defendant choose actions, such as to complain, to comply or to retaliate. By making
these decisions, the players affect their own as well as their opponent’s welfare, such that strategic
behavior may result. Hence, one possibility to facilitate empirical analysis of the central question,
which variables trigger the complaining decision of an injured country, is to arrange the sequence
of decisions in a game theoretical framework. In order to focus the model on the victim’s decision
whether or not to complain, rather than on the panel’s ruling, it is convenient to employ one
simplifying assumption right from the start.
Assumption 2.1. Whenever a violation of the WTO rules occurs, the panel correctly judges it
to be a violation and consequently entitles the victim to retaliate against the offender if the latter
does not comply with the ruling.
5DSU Article 22, para 4.
6This method was used for example in the following cases: DS26 EC-Hormones, DS27 EC-Bananas, DS160
US-Copyright.
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Given this assumption, the simplified sequence of decisions can be described as follows.
Suppose an infringement of a bilateral trade agreement has already occurred and the disputing
countries have been unable to settle the issue amicably. Let the offending country be denoted
by O for offender, and let the country which is suffering from the offense be denoted by V for
victim. Assume further that the infringement causes a welfare loss of D (D ≥ 0) for the victim
and a welfare gain (loot) of Π (Π ≥ 0) for the offender. Then, at the initial node V1, it is up to
Figure 2.1: A Simplified Game of Dispute Settlement
complaindon‘t complain
complydon‘t comply
retaliatedon‘t retaliate
V1
V2
)0;( C−
);( OV RCDR −Π−−
);( Π−D
);( Π−− CD
O
V to decide whether or not to file a complaint at cost C (≥ 0). If V decides not to complain,
the game ends with V suffering from the offense, while O is enjoying the associated loot. If
V decides to complain, the game arrives at node O, where the offender can decide whether to
abolish the disputable trade measure (i.e. “comply”) or to maintain it (i.e. “don’t comply”). In
case O complies, the game ends, and V is relieved of its welfare loss D, while O loses its loot Π.
However, if O does not comply, the game arrives at node V2 where the victim can chose between
“retaliate” and “don’t retaliate”. If no retaliation occurs, the game ends with V suffering from
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the damage and litigation costs, while O enjoys the loot. If retaliation a´ la WTO is implemented,
retaliation affects both the victim’s and the offender’s welfare such that RV (RV ≥ 0) is added
to the victim’s payoff, while the offender’s payoff decreases by RO (RO ≥ 0). Figure 2.1 depicts
the structure of the described game in an extensive form representation. The payoff vectors
(piV , piO) are displayed at the end-nodes with piV denoting the victim’s payoff and piO denoting
the offender’s payoff.
2.2.2 Strategies and Nash Equilibria
Since the dispute settlement process has been modeled as a game of perfect information, the
victim’s set of strategies is given by
S1V := (don′t complain|don′t retaliate)
S2V := (don′t complain|retaliate)
S3V := (complain|don′t retaliate)
S4V := (complain|retaliate),
while the offender’s set of strategies is
S1O := (don′t comply)
S2O := (comply).
Recall that the central purpose of the game theoretic foundation is to identify those equilib-
ria that are characterized by a complaining victim. For the game at hand, two Nash equilibria
involving “complain” can be identified.
Proposition 2.1. The game exhibits two Nash equilibria in “complain”:
(i) {(complain|retaliate), (don′t comply)} is a Nash equilibrium iff Π > RO ∧RV > C.
(ii) {(complain|retaliate), (comply)} is a Nash equilibrium iff Π ≤ RO ∧D > C.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
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Note that the two Nash equilibria in “complain” exclude each other since Π > RO excludes
Π ≤ RO and vice versa. Hence,
RV > C ∧D > C (2.1)
is a sufficient condition for observing “complain” in equilibrium. In line with basic intuition,
the following intermediate results can be verbalized.
Intermediate Results
A country that is suffering from the infringement of a bilateral trade agreement would be ex-
pected to file a complaint in equilibrium if
(i) litigation costs are low,
(ii) the victim’s gain from retaliation is large,
(iii) the victim’s damage from the initial offense is large.
2.3 Payoff Proxies for the Binary Decision Model
Up to now, the payoff elements of the game that have been found to influence a victim’s binary
decision whether or not to complain are entirely unobservable variables in a theoretical frame-
work. Therefore, this section discusses the selection of appropriate “real world” proxies for these
payoff elements after a brief introduction into the general structure of binary decision models.
2.3.1 General Setup of the Probit Model
Let yi represent the choice of the ith victim, which takes the value 1 if the victim files a complaint
and 0 otherwise. Consider that a rational individual would prefer to complain whenever doing
so yields more utility than not complaining, but that these utility levels are unobservable. Let
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the ith victim’s utility from complaining be denoted by Ui1 while utility from not complaining
is denoted by Ui0. Moreover, define y∗i := Ui1 − Ui0. Then it holds that
yi =

1 if y∗i > 0
0 if y∗i ≤ 0.
(2.2)
Note that in equation 2.2, yi apparently is observable as opposed to y∗i . The insights from the
dispute settlement game suggest that a particular victim’s utility from complaining and not com-
plaining would be determined by a vector of exogenous and observable variables. Consequently
y∗i is as well determined by a vector of these exogenous variables. In particular, let
y∗i := x
′
iβ + εi , (2.3)
where x′i denotes the vector of exogenous variables, β denotes the vector of unknown parameters
and εi are random errors. Furthermore, let Pi denote the probability for yi = 1. Then 1− Pi is
the probability for yi = 0. Consequently, it follows from equations (2.2) and (2.3) that
Pi = Prob(yi = 1) = Prob(y∗i > 0) = Prob(εi > −x′iβ). (2.4)
Assuming a symmetric probability distribution, like the normal distribution, it holds as well
that
Pi = Prob(yi = 1) = Prob(y∗i > 0) = Prob(εi < x
′
iβ). (2.5)
Hence, the probability for a complaint can be compactly written as
Pi = F (x′iβ), (2.6)
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where F (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal in case of the
probit model.7
2.3.2 Selection of Proxies
The components of the payoffs in the game theoretic model are generally unobservable in reality.
In order to be able to empirically test the theory’s predictions, it is necessary to find observable
data for the vector of exogenous variables x′ that can be employed as a proxy for each of the
model’s payoff elements.
Litigation Costs
The victim’s costs of litigation may contain various elements. One prerequisite in the course of
the preparation of a complaint is to collect data on the scope of the infringement. Another one is
to calculate the precise monetary value of the injury, using plausible price elasticities, which need
to be estimated in advance. In order to conduct these kinds of economic assessments, the trade
mission of the victim country would either have to hire consultancies that are specialized in this
field, or it would have to use the working capacity of the trade mission’s permanent employees.
In addition to these economic calculations the complaint needs to be prepared by lawyers that
have a sound knowledge of the particular legal aspects of the GATT/WTO agreement. Finally,
in a lengthy dispute there will be traveling costs for several flights, hotel stays, etc. Nordstro¨m
(2005) emphasizes the role that litigation costs play in deterring especially smaller countries from
using the dispute settlement system. Nordstro¨m reports that “[t]he fees charged by top-notch
law firms in Brussels and Washington D.C. are in the range of $500 to $1.000 per hour plus
expenses [...]”.8 Moreover, lawyers are reported to have charged their clients fees in excess of
10 million dollars.9 Bown and Hoekman (2005) report similar figures. In line with Nordstro¨m’s
findings, it may be assumed that the level of litigation costs rises with the complexity of a case,
7For a discussion of the nonlinear probit approach that is used here, see Greene (2003), chapter 21 or Judge
et al. (1988), chapter 19.
8Nordstro¨m (2005), page 1.
9Shaffer et al. (2003).
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but that it is independent of the value of the traded goods at stake in a particular dispute.
One argument that could be made to tie the level of litigation costs to a country specific
variable is as follows. It may plausible to assume that wealthier countries’ governments already
sunk a significant part of their litigation costs by running a large permanent trade mission
in Geneva and having several trade economists and lawyers permanently on their payroll. As
opposed to this, poorer countries, which usually don’t have a “standing army” of economists
and lawyers may regard substantial parts of the litigation costs as variable costs. However,
Bown (2005), who uses data on the number of a country’s delegates at the WTO Secretariat
finds no evidence of such a potential influence on a country’s decision whether or not to file
a complaint. Guzman and Simmons (2005) model the role of litigation costs as a problem of
limited legal capacity. In particular, they assume that the larger a country is in terms of its GDP
(in an alternative model they use the GDP per capita), the larger is the number of disputes this
country can handle.
All in all, litigation costs may either be regarded as decreasing in the victim’s GDP (GDPV )
or they may be regarded as completely independent. Furthermore, there is no theory which
predicts that a victim’s litigation costs increase in its GDP. Hence, it may be expected that
∂C
∂GDPV
≤ 0.
The Victim’s Gains and Losses from Import Restrictions
Proposition 2.1 includes RV as a variable reflecting a gain from an import restriction for the
active (tariff setting) country and D as a variable that reflects a loss from an import restriction
for the passive country.
There are two economic reasons for why the active country may benefit from implementing
an import restriction. First, countries may put more weight on the producer surplus of their
domestic import substituting industries than on consumer surplus in the market for a particular
commodity. This stronger weight on producer surplus could be explained by industry lobbying
efforts, hence by political economy models, whose empirical verification would require infor-
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mation on lobbying intensities in the affected countries. The second economic reason is one
that applies to those countries that are large enough to influence world market prices. These
countries can influence the terms of trade in their favor such that they realize a net welfare
gain from the imposition of an import barrier. Figure 2.2 schematically depicts the effects of an
import tariff, levied by a large country. The downward sloping line M represents the country’s
Figure 2.2: Welfare Effects of an Import Tariff
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import demand while the upward sloping line X represents global export supply. Initially, when
there is no tariff, the world market price pw0 equals the domestic price p0, while q0 indicates the
initially traded quantity. Suppose that now the importing country levies a tariff of τ . Then the
domestic price rises to p1 and reduces import demand to a quantity of q1. Since global supply is
not completely elastic, the reduction in import demand leads to a reduction of the world market
price to pw1 . The effects on the welfare of the importing country are ambiguous. That is, on the
one hand, consumer surplus is reduced by the trapezoid area a + b, but on the other hand, a
tariff revenue of the rectangular area a+ c is gained. So the net welfare gain for the importer is
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c − b.10 Clearly this difference decreases as the global export supply gets more and more elas-
tic. Finally, if the importer faced a completely elastic export supply, the area c would vanish,
such that the complete tariff plus the deadweight loss had to be borne by domestic consumers.
Consequently, a net welfare loss would be the result if world market supply were sufficiently
elastic. Thus, if the offender is a large supplier on the world market for the retaliation good, its
more elastic export supply function is likely to reduce the retaliatory gain for the victim. On
the basis of exports to the European Union, Nordstro¨m (2005) finds empirical evidence for the
claim that larger or wealthier countries are larger suppliers on the world market, both overall
and in individual commodities. Moreover, Nordstro¨m finds that “[a] subdivision of GDP into
population and per capita income does not change the result very much. In other words, it does
not matter if the supplying nation is small because of a small population or poor population.”11
Hence, it may be conjectured that the offender’s GDP (i.e. GDPO) reduces the victim’s gain
from retaliation: ∂RV∂GDPO < 0.
Furthermore, the elasticity of the importing country’s demand plays a role as well. Consider
the consequences of a less elastic (i.e. steeper) import demand curve on the net welfare gain
c−b. Obviously b would increase when holding c fixed or, vice versa c would shrink when holding
b fixed, so that the net welfare gain would decrease. Note that a poor country’s import demand
is more likely to be less elastic since imports are more likely to lack domestic substitutes.
The bottom line message from this little exercise is that bigger victim countries are more
likely to be able to extract a large gain (i.e. large RV ) from imposing a retaliatory import
restriction because (i) bigger countries usually have a more elastic import demand since they
are more likely to produce domestic substitutes, and (ii) bigger countries are more likely to be
able to influence world market prices and consequently face a less elastic export supply, especially
if the targeted exporter is small. In a theoretical analysis, Anderson (2002) emphasizes these
difficulties that are predominantly faced by smaller countries that consider the implementation
10Any increase of a potentially existing domestic import substituting producer’s surplus is out of the scope of
this analysis.
11Nordstro¨m (2005), page 8.
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of retaliatory measures. Broda et al. (2006) found empirical evidence that is mirroring this result
in the data. In their empirical study they show that countries indeed seem to take the relevant
elasticities into account when setting their tariffs. Thus it may be concluded that ∂RV∂GDPV > 0.
Furthermore, two additional variables play a crucial role for the gains from retaliation. First,
the value of the victim’s imports from the offender constitutes an upper bound for the imple-
mentation of retaliation since retaliation can apparently only target these imports. Hence, for
the trade value of the exports from the offender to the victim (XOV ) it may be assumed to hold
that ∂RV∂XOV > 0. Second, since the WTO’s equivalence condition authorizes retaliation up to the
magnitude of the initial damage, the trade value of the disputed commodities (DTV) limits the
extent of retaliation as well. Hence, it may be conjectured that ∂RV∂DTV > 0.
What is left to proxy for, are the detrimental effects of the initial import restriction on the
victim. Tariff equivalents of the offense would be a desirable but rarely available proxy since
the files of most disputes’ cases lack precise information on the concrete scale of the offense.
Moreover, many dispute settlement proceedings come to an end before a panel ruled on the
issue, such that there are virtually no numbers available. However, all else equal, the magnitude
of the initial damage D should be positively correlated with the trade value of the disputed
commodity. Hence, it seems likely that ∂D∂DTV > 0.
2.3.3 Summary of Hypotheses
Bringing together the selected proxies with the insights of the dispute settlement game, a link
between empirically observable data and the expected behavior of a victim country can be
established. In particular, the probability for observing that an injured country files a complaint
is given by Pi = F (x′iβ), where x
′ now incorporates the observable variables. Consequently,
previous arguing leads to the following hypotheses.
(H1) dPidGDPV =
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Pi
∂RV
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂RV
∂GDPV
+
(−)︷︸︸︷
∂Pi
∂C
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂C
∂GDPV
> 0
24
(H2) dPidGDPO =
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Pi
∂RV
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂RV
∂GDPO
< 0
(H3) dPidDTV =
(+)︷︸︸︷
∂Pi
∂D
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂D
∂DTV
+
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Pi
∂RV
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂RV
∂DTV
> 0
(H4) dPidXOV =
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂Pi
∂RV
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂RV
∂XOV
> 0
2.4 Sample Selection
Both the variables of the game theoretic model and the suggestions for how to proxy for these
are based on the assumption that the initial offense has been any measure that adversely affects
imports. As a consequence, the model so far may not be applied to disputes dealing with
e.g. export subsidies or violations of intellectual property rights. Moreover, it is required
that the bundle of affected commodities can be determined. Practically this means that only
those disputes are included that deal with import restrictions and for which information on the
Harmonized System (HS) codes of the disputable commodities is available. This information is
generally found in the WTO’s case records, which are publicly available on the webpages of the
WTO.12
Furthermore, since the value of the bilateral trade flow of the disputable commodity is
of major interest, trade data for the particular HS codes have to be available for the selected
disputes. The UN COMTRADE database provides data on the vast majority of all bilateral trade
flows up to the year 2005. Trade flows from 2006 are not yet covered sufficiently. Consequently,
disputes from 1995 through 2005 are included. Out of the total number of 335 disputes that
have arisen in that period, 185 deal with import restrictions.13
Among these 185 disputes the most frequently involved articles and agreements are National
12In some cases, for which the WTO does not provide the HS codes, this information has been taken from Horn
and Mavroidis (2006), who provide a comprehensive database on disputes from 1995 through early 2004.
13See Appendix A.2 for a list of these disputes.
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Treatment (60 disputes), Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (50 disputes), Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties (41 disputes), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(30 disputes), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (21 disputes), and the Agreement
on Safeguards (21 disputes). Note that in the majority of the disputes the complainant addressed
more than one agreement or article. Moreover, in several of these 185 disputes there are multiple
complainants such that the number of countries complaining is 198.
2.4.1 Selection of Injured Countries
Clearly it is plausible to assume the 198 complainants have been injured by the 185 offenses, but
who else suffered from these offenses and did not complain? There is no certain answer to this
question because for most cases there is virtually no information on the “dark figure” of victims
available. However, given a sample in which the distinction between those countries that did
not complain although they suffered on the one hand and those countries that did neither suffer
nor complain on the other hand is known with certainty, it is possible to shed some light on the
dark figure by means of statistical inference. Therefore, the remainder of this subsection will
suggest a procedure for how to judge whether a country has suffered from a particular import
restriction.
Necessary Condition
First, only those countries that have been a member of the WTO in the year of the dispute have
been entitled to file a complaint in the first place. Second, only those WTO members will be
considered to have suffered from an offense, which imported the disputable commodity into the
offending country either in the year of the dispute or in the year before the dispute.14
14The disputable commodity is specified with a precision of four digits according to the HS classification system.
Note that most import restrictions specify the targeted commodities with a precision of four digits. Consequently
the WTO’s case records as well as the database of Horn and Mavroidis (2006) is dominated by four digit HS
precision. Moreover, especially for many lower middle and low income countries, four digits is the highest degree
of reporting precision for most bilateral trade flows.
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Sufficient Condition
One possibility to reason whether one of the countries that already satisfy the necessary condi-
tion has been affected by an offense, is to look for “suspicious” variations in the trade flow of the
disputable commodity. Common sense would suggest that, all else being equal, the implemen-
tation of an import barrier should lead to a reduction in trade flows in the year of the dispute
(or the year before the dispute) compared to the average trade flows of the previous years.
In order to derive an appropriate sufficient condition that is based on a variation in trade
flows, data from Bown (2005) are being exploited in the following way. There are 19 cases
dealing with import restrictions in Bown (2005), where not all trading partners of the dis-
putable commodity have been affected by the offense of the respondent. For these 19 cases,
Bown succeeds in identifying those trading partners that have suffered from the offense.15 In
the next step, this list of injured but non-complaining trading partners of the 19 offenders is
augmented by all non-complaining trading partners who exported the particular commodity to
the 19 offenders. When comparing the non-injured non-complaining trading partners to the
injured non-complaining trading partners, it becomes apparent that indeed the exports of the
injured countries exhibit a dip, as opposed to the exports of the non-injured countries. Hence
a criterion, based on this observation may be used in order to distinguish between injured and
non-injured countries. In order to avoid distortions arising from variations in output levels, let
the criterion be based on the relative share of exports of the disputable commodity that are
shipped from the ith potential victim to the offender at time t, where t denotes the year of the
dispute. Let TV iot denote the ith potential victim’s exports to the offender at time t, and let
TV iwt denote the ith potential victim’s exports to the world at time t. Then the share of exports
15I am grateful to Chad Bown who was so kind to send me data on the countries which have suffered from
the 19 offenses, that Bown (2005), page 9 describes as follows. “[...] 19 WTO-inconsistent policies in the sample
were applied on at least a ‘quasi’-MFN basis, in that even though an MFN-violation is a key element of the
dispute, we were still able to identify from other, non-WTO sources the other exporting countries in addition to
the complainant facing the discrimination of the WTO-inconsistent policy.”
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that is shipped from the ith victim to the offender at time t is simply
Sit :=
TV iot
TV iwt
. (2.7)
Consequently, the average share of exports that have been shipped from the ith victim to the
offender from time t− k until time t− l, with k > l is
µikl :=
1
k − l + 1
k∑
j=l
Sit−j . (2.8)
Building on this, let the criterion be defined as the share of exports at time t over the average
share of exports from t− k to t− 2.16 Hence the criterion Φik is
Φik :=
Sit
µik2
. (2.9)
The distributional properties of the two alternative criteria Φi3 and Φ
i
4 in the Bown (2005)
sample are displayed in Table 2.2. For Φi3 the number of injured (non-injured) countries is 56
(247). For Φi4 the number of injured (non-injured) countries is 44 (196).
17 Table 2.2 shows that
Subsample injured countries non-injured countries
Criterion Φi3 Φ
i
4 Φ
i
3 Φ
i
4
Mean 1.004962804 1.001819577 2.733825779 1.675199294
Std. Dev. 0.446674356 0.632216268 10.10916218 2.66398746
Observations 56 44 247 196
Table 2.2: Distribution of Selection Criteria in the Sample
injured countries exhibit lower values of both alternative criteria than non-injured countries. A
test for different means of Φi3 and Φ
i
4 in the two subsamples rejects the Null hypothesis of a
16The trade flows in the year before the official filing of the complaint (i.e. t − 1) may already be affected by
the offense. To avoid complications that could arise due to the potential endogenous character of the trade flow
in t− 1, this period is being omitted.
17This difference in the number of observations is owed to the fact that the Φik criteria require the availability
of bilateral trade data with a precision of four digits for several consecutive years. While Φi3 requires data for
only three years (i.e. t, t− 2 and t− 3), Φi4 requires data for four years (i.e. t, t− 2, t− 3 and t− 4).
28
common mean.18 Thus, the criteria may serve to select injured countries from the population of
those countries that already satisfy the necessary condition for being injured. In particular, the
approach taken here defines a cut-off level for Φi4, so that all countries which exhibit a Φ
i
4 below
this cut-off level will be judged as injured.19 To formalize the cut-off level, let µ1 and σ1 denote
the mean and the standard deviation of Φi4 in the subsample of injured countries, respectively.
Moreover, let α denote the the probability of an alpha error, i.e. erroneously judging an injured
country to be non-injured.20 Then the cut-off level is denoted by
Φcut4 (α) := z1−α(µ1, σ1), (2.10)
where z denotes the α quantile of a normal distribution with mean µ1 and standard deviation
σ1. Finally, the selection of countries is conducted according to Assumption 2.2.
Assumption 2.2. A country i that satisfies the necessary conditions for being injured is assumed
to have suffered from an offender’s disputable trade measure if and only if
Φi4 ≤ Φcut4 (α). (2.11)
2.4.2 Description of the Data
Selecting injured countries according to the previously determined rules yields 2,409 injured
countries when applying Φcut4 (0.05).
21 Among these injured countries there are 195 countries
18The hypotheses are H0 : µ1 − µ2 = 0 vs. H1 : µ1 − µ2 6= 0, where µ1 represents a criterion’s mean
in the subsample of injured countries and µ2 represents a criterion’s mean in the subsample of non-injured
countries. Furthermore let D be the difference of the subsample means. It follows that D(Φi3) = 1.728862975 and
D(Φi4) = 0.673370718. Using a pooled standard deviation s, the test statistic Θ =
D
s
is asymptotically normal
distributed. In particular ΘΦi3
= 2.670699463 and ΘΦi4
= 3.150306819. Hence the Null hypothesis can be rejected
for both criteria on all reasonable significance levels (i.e. 10%, 5% and 1% in a two-sided test).
19The test for different means suggests that Φi4 is slightly more powerful than Φ
i
3 for distinguishing between
injured and non-injured countries. A disadvantage of Φi4 as opposed to Φ
i
3 clearly is the more excessive data
requirement and its implications for a sample selection bias. However, the section dealing with the robustness of
the results shows that whether Φi3 or Φ
i
4 is employed does not change the results qualitatively.
20The trade-off between alpha and beta error as well as the rationale for preferring to have a low alpha error
in this criterion are discussed in Appendix A.3.
21The results do not change qualitatively when k = 3 and/or other levels for the alpha error are employed, as
the subsection on robustness shows. Hence it is an arbitrary decision, which one of the criteria is chosen. The
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that filed a complaint.22 For this sample, a data set of exogenous variables is compiled. The data
set includes the “primary” variables DTV , GDPO, GDPV and XOV . Moreover, as “secondary”
variables, the offender’s and victim’s GDP per capita as well as an index of economic freedom
are included in the data set in order to employ these for robustness checks in a later subsection.
- DTV denotes the trade value of the exports of the disputable commodity with a precision of
four digits according to the Harmonized System classification that are shipped from the victim
to the offender in the year before the complaint in US Dollars.23 Information on the HS codes
is taken from the WTO’s “Documents Online”24 webpage or from Horn and Mavroidis (2006).
Bilateral trade values are taken from UN COMTRADE25.
- GDPO denotes the gross domestic product of the offender in the year of the complaint in US
Dollars. Data on this variable are taken from the World Bank.
- GDPPCO denotes the gross domestic product of the offender in the year of the complaint in
US Dollars. Data on this variable are taken from the World Bank.
- GDPV denotes the gross domestic product of the victim in the year of the complaint in US
Dollars. Data on this variable are taken from the World Bank.
- GDPPCV denotes the gross domestic product per capita of the victim in the year of the
complaint. Data on this variable are taken from the World Bank.
- XOV denotes the trade value of all exports that are shipped from the offender to the victim
in the year before the complaint.26 Data on this variable are taken from UN COMTRADE.
remainder of the chapter refers to the sample compiled by Φcut4 (0.05).
22Note that the previously reported number of 198 complaining countries has been reduced by three. This
reduction is owed to the unavailability of trade data for the Dominican Republic, which is a defendant in disputes
300, 302 and 333. Thus, XOV is not available for these three disputes.
23Since this variable should capture the amount of goods targeted, it is plausible to use the trade value at t− 1
in order to deal with the problem that the disputable trade measure may have already reduced the trade value
at time t.
24See http://docsonline.wto.org/.
25See http://comtrade.un.org/db/.
26It may be the case that the aggregated bilateral trade flow has already been affected by the trade dispute in
the year of the filing of the complaint. To avoid this potential endogeneity problem, the trade flow at time t− 1
is used.
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- EFV denotes the index of economic freedom for the victim in the year of the complaint.27
Table 2.3 reports mean and standard deviation for these variables separately for complaining and
non-complaining countries selected according to Φcut4 (0.05). Table 2.3 already shows that the
Subsample complaining non-complaining all
Variable\Variate mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. t-value
DTV 9.04E+8 2.78E+9 2.29E+8 1.10E+9 2.84E+8 1.33E+9 3.37***
GDPO 4.76E+12 4.47E+12 6.95E+12 4.17E+12 6.78E+12 4.23E+12 -6.59***
GDPPCO 18,337 12,890 24,620 11,623 24,111 11.852 -6.58***
GDPV 3.64E+12 4.27E+12 8.12E+11 2.26E+12 1.04E+12 2.60E+12 9.14***
GDPPCV 16,071 13,016 11,346 12,238 11,729 12,367 4.88***
XOV 4.07E+10 6.03E+10 1.20E+10 2.98E+10 1.43E+10 3.42E+10 6.58***
EFV 67.56 9.18 65.76 10.63 65.91 10.53 2.59***
Observations 195 2,214 2,409
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Exogenous Variables
previous theoretical considerations regarding the primary variables show up in the data, at least
on the basis of a comparison of conditional means. In particular, complaining victims exhibit
higher trade values of the disputable commodity than non-complaining victims on average (i.e.
USD 9.04E+8 > USD 2.29E+8). Moreover, complaining victims exhibit a higher GDP than
non-complaining victims (i.e. USD 3.64E+12 > USD 8.12E+11) on average. The retaliatory
capacity, measured by XOV , shows that complaining victims feature a higher level of this variable
than non-complaining victims (i.e. USD 4.07E+10 > USD 1.20E+10) on average. The offender’s
economic power, measured by GDPO, exhibits a lower level in those cases where a victim filed a
complaint as opposed to those cases where a victim did not file a complaint (i.e. USD 4.76E+12
< USD 6.95E+12) on average. A two-tailed t-test rejects the null hypothesis of a common mean
even on the one percent significance level for each variable.
Table 2.4 shows the correlation of the employed variables. Most values’ signs and magnitudes
are in line with intuition e.g. GDPO exhibits a strong positive correlation with GDPPCO, and
27The index of economic freedom that is used here is taken from the Heritage Foundation (2006). Missing
data on particular countries are augmented by decoupling the index of economic freedom provided by the Fraser
Institute (2006). The index is scaled between 0 and 100 with 100 indicating the highest degree of economic
freedom and zero indicating the lowest degree of economic freedom.
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Variable DTV GDPO GDPPCO GDPV GDPPCV XOV EFV
DTV 1 0.0643 0.0777 0.1696 0.1506 0.3623 0.1088
GDPO 1 0.8415 -0.2515 -0.1542 0.1709 -0.1665
GDPPCO 1 -0.2259 -0.1317 0.1665 -0.1191
GDPV 1 0.4867 0.4690 0.2161
GDPPCV 1 0.3637 0.6484
XOV 1 0.1998
EFV 1
Table 2.4: Correlation Matrix of Exogenous Variables
GDPPCV shows a strong positive correlation with EFV . More noteworthy is the finding that
all GDP based variables of the offender are negatively correlated with the GDP based variables
of the victims. In a sense, this underpins the results of Guzman and Simmons (2005) that
opposing parties tend to be rather of unequal size than of equal size in terms of their GDP.
However, the finding here holds for all victims, whereas the finding of Guzman and Simmons
refers to the subset of complaining victims.
The data presented so far are being analyzed by means of a probit model subsequently.
2.5 Estimation and Results
Treating all observations as being individual (e.g. the US complaining in 1995 is a different
victim than the US complaining in 1996), there are no repeated observations available. As
a consequence, the reaction of one and the same individual in more than one environment of
explanatory variables does not occur.
The estimation method will therefore require the maximization of the likelihood function,
which is ` =
∏T
i=1 f(yi) =
∏T
i=1 F (x
′
iβ)
yi [1 − F (x′iβ)](1−yi), where F (·) is again the cumulative
distribution function of the normal distribution. After taking the logarithm, the function be-
comes ln` =
∑T
i=1 yi lnF (x
′
iβ)+
∑T
i=1(1−yi) ln[1−F (x′iβ)]. The maximization of this function
via β is conducted using the numerical iterative Newton-Raphson method, which guarantees the
convergence to the global maximum of the function.28 The alternative maximization algorithm
28See Greene (2003), page 670 ff. for a more detailed description of the properties of the Newton-Raphson
estimation method.
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method of Quadratic Hill Climbing as well as the Gauss-Newton algorithm confirm the results
of the Newton-Raphson algorithm by producing similar results.29
Table 2.5 presents the results of five different probit regressions, where y is regressed on
a vector of the previously introduced exogenous variables. The underlying sample selection
criterion is Φcut4 (0.05), yielding 2,409 observations (195 complaining and 2,214 non-complaining
victims). Standard errors are computed according to Huber/White (quasi maximum likelihood),
while *, **, and *** indicate a variable’s significance on a ten, five, and one percent level
respectively.30
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b Model 4
C -1.3855*** -1.2927*** -1.1072*** -1.2903*** -1.7085***
GDPO -4.01E-14*** -6.40E-14*** -8.51E-14*** -6.42E-14***
GDPV 1.11E-13*** 7.11E-14*** 7.19E-14***
DTV 8.50E-11*** 5.11E-11** 5.30E-11**
XOV 5.99E-12*** 9.73E-12*** 6.65E-12*** 7.16E-12***
DTV
GDPV
1.9513 3.7117
GDPV
GDPO
0.0548***
(GDPVGDPO )
2 -0.0004***
McFadden R2 0.1239 0.1451 0.1215 0.1416 0.1316
Akaike 0.4958 0.4848 0.4972 0.4867 0.4923
Schwarz 0.5055 0.4968 0.5068 0.4987 0.5043
Hannan-Quinn 0.4993 0.4891 0.5007 0.4911 0.4967
Table 2.5: Probit Results for Level Data under Φcut4 (0.05)
Model 1 shows that the estimated coefficients of a regression of y on a constant, both GDPs
and the disputable trade value are in line with the earlier predictions from theory. In particular,
a victim is more likely to file a complaint if it is large in terms of GDP, if the offender is small
in terms of GDP, and if the disputable trade value is large. All coefficients are significant at the
one percent level.
Model 2 augments Model 1 by adding the aggregated export flow from the offender to
the victim as a proxy for the victim’s retaliatory capacity. While XOV exhibits the predicted
29The software used for the estimation of the following models is EViews 5.0.
30Employing other computational concepts of standard errors, such as generalized least squares, leads only to
minor changes in the significance levels. The changes in significance are small enough to ensure that all *, **,
and *** notations remain valid for every variable in each of the five models.
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positive sign, the significance level of DTV deteriorates slightly due to a high degree of positive
correlation between XOV and DTV .31 Still the explanatory power of each variable is large
enough to maintain a five percent significance level even for the least significant variable.
Model 3a and Model 3b are based on the same variables as Model 2, but they employ a
relative measure of the disputable commodity by choosing DTVGDPV as a regressor. This is done in
order to address the question whether the relative importance of a victim’s targeted exports in
terms of the victim’s GDP may contribute to explaining a victim’s incentive to file a complaint.
The results of Table 2.5 basically turn this idea down by showing an insignificant coefficient,
while leaving the other variables’ signs and explanatory power unaffected.
Model 4 elaborates on the idea of using the ratio of the victim’s GDP to the offender’s
GDP as a regressor. The results show that a victim’s relative economic size explains the choice
between complaining and not complaining almost as well as the separate inclusion of each GDP
in Model 2. Moreover, the negative sign of the squared GDP ratio indicates a positive and
concave relationship between the GDP ratio and the probability to file a complaint.
All in all, the results agree with the predictions of the stylized game theory in that a country’s
economic power promotes its incentive to file a complaint against an offending trading partner.
In line with intuition, the results show that a high trade value of the targeted commodity
increases a country’s probability to file a complaint as well. Moreover, the economic power of
the offending country is detrimental to the injured country’s probability of using the dispute
settlement system. This particular result means as well that economically large countries can
freeride on their own size by committing infringements of trade agreements with small trading
partners since the latter are likely to be deterred from filing a complaint in the first place.
While all models’ findings agree with the earlier presented theory, the McFadden R2 as well as
the Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria consistently prefer Model 2 to the other four
models.32
31The z-Statistic of DTV falls from 3.9096 to 2.2095 in the course of the introduction of XOV . The generalized
least squares regression of DTV on a constant and XOV , i.e. DTV = β0 + β1XOV + ε, yields a positive value for
β1 with a highly significant t-Statistic of 6.9774.
32Hence, Model 2 will be the benchmark model for further augmentation in the subsection on robustness.
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The insight from Model 3a and 3b, that the relative importance of the disputable trade
value compared to the victim’s GDP does not serve to explain the observed behavior, is in line
with the game theoretic foundation. This is because the potential gain from complaining is tied
to the absolute trade value of the commodity at stake and not to some relative measure of it.
Once the potential gain of filing a complaint, which is approximated by DTV , falls short of
the litigation costs C, there is no point in complaining at all.33 Of course, a victim’s ability to
enforce the offender’s compliance, and therefore its ability to reap any gains from compliance,
is dependent on the victim’s economic power. However, a victim’s ability to force an offender
into compliance depends upon the victim’s absolute threat of retaliation, which in turn depends
positively upon the victims size, positively upon its retaliatory capacity and, via the amount
of authorized retaliation, positively upon the disputed trade value, but not upon the ratio of
disputable trade value and GDP. As an example, consider a victim i with a low GDPV and DTV
resulting in a particular DTViGDPV i . This ith victim has a lower probability of filing a complaint
than a victim j that exhibits just a ratio of DTVjGDPV j ≤
DTVi
GDPV i
if this jth victim is characterized
by absolutely larger values of DTV and/or GDPV . Since the export structure of many low and
lower middle income countries is rather concentrated on e.g. a few agricultural goods, textiles,
raw materials, and raw products, it can be conjectured that these countries are struck relatively
“hard” in terms of their GDP by any import barrier targeting their exports.34 Nevertheless, as
long as the absolute value of the targeted goods is not high enough to break even with litigation
costs, and as long as such a victim cannot reap potential gains from retaliation, it is unlikely to
file a complaint, both from the theoretical and the empirical perspective.
33Nordstro¨m and Shaffer (2007), page 1, argue in a similar way: “The law makes no distinction between a claim
of 100 thousand dollars and a claim of 100 million dollars. In practice, however, it may be difficult to enforce a
100 thousand dollars claim because of the substantial resource commitments involved in a legal dispute.” Hence,
the absolute value of the claim compared to the absolute value of litigation costs should influence whether or not
a country files a complaint.
34Shaffer et al. (2003), page 15, express this observation in the following way:“Developing countries often have
high per capita stakes in individual cases, so that WTO law can be of potential benefit to them. Overall, however,
developing countries simply export a vastly narrower array and limited value and volume of exports than do the
United States and EC.”
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2.6 Robustness
The purpose of this subsection is to check whether the results obtained from the benchmark
model of the previous chapter are robust to (i) augmenting the model by adding explanatory
variables, (ii) employing the logarithm of the exogenous variables, and (iii) conducting changes
in the sample selection criterion.
2.6.1 Additional Explanatory Variables
Table 2.6 shows that the estimated coefficients of the primary variables maintain their sign and
remain significant at least at five percent when the victim’s index of economic freedom (XOV ),
the victim’s GDP per capita (GDPPCV ) and the offender’s GDP per capita (GDPPCO) are
added to the benchmark model of Table 2.5.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
C -1.3855*** -1.2927*** -0.5241* -1.040*** -0.9402**
GDPO -4.01E-14*** -6.40E-14*** -6.89E-14*** -6.90E-14*** -2.42E-14
GDPV 1.11E-13*** 7.11E-14*** 7.65E-14*** 1.00E-13*** 9.97E-14***
DTV 8.50E-11*** 5.11E-11** 5.37E-11** 5.64E-11** 5.90E-11**
XOV 5.99E-12*** 6.53E-12*** 6.95E-12*** 7.29E-12***
EFV -0.0115*** -0.001 -0.0008
GDPPCV -1.59E-5** -1.66E-05**
GDPPCO -1.89E-06***
McFadden R2 0.1239 0.1451 0.150329 0.1560 0.1625
Akaike 0.4958 0.4848 0.4826 0.4803 0.4774
Schwarz 0.5055 0.4968 0.4970 0.4971 0.4967
Hannan-Quinn 0.4993 0.4891 0.4878 0.4864 0.4844
Table 2.6: Probit Results for the Augmented Model under Φcut4 (0.05)
Wilckens (2009 forthcoming) uses a similar binary regression model that is based on the same
data and adds dummy variables for those disputes where there have been multiple complainants.
This is done in order to address potential synergies that may arise when several complainants
share litigation costs. However, the results of Wilckens (2009 forthcoming) do not differ from
the findings at hand.
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2.6.2 Specification in Logarithms
Table 2.7 reports the estimated coefficients for the logarithms of the explanatory variables. Note
that all results of the benchmark model prove to be robust to the specification in logarithms.
There are no changes in sign nor any major changes in the significance levels. All signs and most
significance levels are sustained as well if a constant is included into the logarithmic model.35
Goodness-of-fit tests like the Hosmer-Lemeshow and the Andrews test even favor the log spec-
ification of Model 2 without constant to the level specification that is used in the benchmark
model.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
log(GDPO) -0.2243*** -0.2553*** -0.2037*** -0.2491*** -0.2528***
log(GDPV ) 0.1104*** 0.0804*** 0.1421*** 0.1467*** 0.1473***
log(DTV ) 0.1271*** 0.1078*** 0.1056*** 0.1067*** 0.1068***
log(XOV ) 0.0910*** 0.0659** 0.1043*** 0.1037***
log(EFV ) -0.5996*** -0.2265 -0.2222
log(GDPPCV ) -0.1426*** -0.1429***
log(GDPPCO) 0.0090
Akaike 0.4677 0.4638 0.4604 0.4576 0.4584
Schwarz 0.4749 0.4734 0.4724 0.4720 0.4753
Hannan-Quinn 0.4703 0.4673 0.4648 0.4629 0.4646
Table 2.7: Probit Results for the Augmented Model in Logs under Φcut4 (0.05)
2.6.3 Alternative Sample Selection Criteria
Changes in the sample selection criterion Φcutk (α) may affect both the initial year t − k of the
calculated average and the level of the alpha error separately and jointly, for level data and for
logarithmic data. The following Table 2.8 shows estimates for the coefficients of the benchmark
Model 2 for different selection criteria, using level data. Table A.3 analogously provides estimates
for Model 2 with logarithmic data.36 The leftmost column of both tables shows the estimates of
the original benchmark model with k = 4 and α = 0.05, while the three remaining columns show
the estimation results for different values of k and α. Note that the number of observations, i.e.
35See Table A.2 in Appendix A.4.
36See Table A.3 in Appendix A.5.
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the number of countries classified as injured, varies with the changes in the selection criterion.
Moreover, Wilckens (2009 forthcoming), who employs the same data and drops the selection
Variable\Criterion Φcut4 (0.05) Φcut4 (0.1) Φcut3 (0.05) Φcut3 (0.1)
C -1.2927*** -1.2772*** -1.3544*** -1.332***
GDPO -6.40E-14*** -6.41E-14*** -6.14E-14*** -6.19E-14***
GDPV 7.11E-14*** 7.00E-14*** 7.50E-14*** 7.47E-14***
DTV 5.11E-11** 5.06E-11** 5.22E-11** 5.13E-11**
XOV 5.99E-12*** 6.00E-12*** 6.01E-12*** 6.00E-12***
McFadden R2 0.1451 0.1436 0.1466 0.1465
Akaike 0.4848 0.4959 0.4586 0.4707
Schwarz 0.4968 0.5082 0.4699 0.4823
Hannan-Quinn 0.4891 0.5003 0.4627 0.4749
Observations 2,409 2,338 2,599 2,506
Table 2.8: Probit Results for Level Data under Various Sample Selection Criteria
criterion entirely, still ends up with consistent results.
Although the conducted alterations of the sample selection criterion do not change the main
results of the regression, there are two caveats that should be mentioned.
First, consider the case where an offender infringes a trade agreement, but not even one single
victim files a complaint. Clearly the offender and all victims of this infringement are not observed
and not included in the analysis.37 From what has been argued throughout this chapter so far,
it may be conjectured that these completely invisible violations are predominantly characterized
by a large offender (in terms of GDPO) committing an offense that is not too severe (in terms
of DTV ) against a bunch of small victims (in terms of GDPV ) which exhibit a low retaliatory
capacity (in terms of XOV ). Hence, the sample of victims that is used in this chapter is likely
to exhibit a systematic bias against country pairings with the just described properties.
Second, data availability is generally worse for poorer countries than for wealthier countries.
Hence, some of the poorest victims’ trade flows may not be included in the COMTRADE
database. Consequently, the previously described bias is growing even stronger since victims with
low GDPV and low DTV are more likely to be missing in the database. However, this second
concern is perhaps not as problematic as the first one since it should reasonably be assumed
37At present the author cannot imagine a method for making these cases visible.
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that a victim which does not even keep track of its own trade flows, does not take notice of an
infringement of a trade agreement. This monitoring problem of the smallest countries mitigates
the bias since a victim can only make a conscious decision on whether to complain or not if it
observes the offense at all. Furthermore, those smallest countries which do not take notice of a
trading partner’s offense against any of their exporters should not be included into the analysis,
even if it were possible to do so. This is because the probit model aims at explaining deliberate
decisions under the assumption of equal information for every victim. A (hypothetical) inclusion
of the non-monitoring victims would cause an omitted variable bias since these victims would
apparently never file a complaint. But they would do so because they exhibit the property of
being unable to monitor their trade flows and not as a results of a diligent decision making
process like the other monitoring victims.
As a summary, it can be stated that all central results have proved to be robust to the
conducted changes in variables, model specifications and sample selection criteria. Moreover,
the approach presented here is unable to overcome the problem of identifying the victims of
those infringements where not even a single country filed a complaint.
2.7 A Note on Guzman and Simmons (2005)
Recall the central finding of Guzman and Simmons (2005) that the relationship between both
parties’ GDP is negative, that is, all else equal, smaller countries are more likely to complain
against bigger countries. Consequently, their result contrasts this study’s results as small victims
have been found to be deterred from complaining against bigger offenders.
A possible explanation for this discrepancy may lie in the way how Guzman and Simmons
take their Capacity Hypothesis to the data. Consider that a low endowment of legal resources
may be understood as a high level of litigation costs. Hence, along the lines of Guzman and
Simmons, small countries face a high level of litigation costs. Recall that this chapter’s model
produced the trivial insight that either the initial damage or the gain from retaliation must
exceed litigation costs in order to render a complaint worthwhile. Thus, if one is concerned
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that poor countries lack legal resources, one should be tempted to say that these countries will
predominantly engage infringements that cause a high damage which lets them break even with
their high level of litigation costs.38 Still in line with this argument, Guzman and Simmons
speak of a “large market”39, but what they indeed use to control for the size of the affected
market in their regression is the offender’s GDP. Granted, the market size or the disputable
trade value at stake could be positively correlated with the offender’s GDP, but note that this
correlation may be very low.40 This is due to the fact that log(DTV ) strongly varies across the
individual disputes. Hence, the information that is incorporated in the trade value at stake is
close to orthogonal to the offender’s GDP.
It would be an interesting question to ask, whether the relationship between both parties’
GDPs would remain negative if one augmented a regression of the Guzman and Simmons fashion
by log(DTV ). Thus, it would be possible to distinguish between a victim’s incentive to complain
against infringements of large markets on the one hand, and its disincentive to mess with bigger
countries on the other hand. From previous insights, we would hypothesize that, all else equal,
the GDP of an offender should be increasing in the disputable trade value and in the victim’s
GDP. This is because a complaint against a big country is more likely to be profitable if the
complainant himself and/or the trade value at stake is large. Equation 2.12 describes the
regression approach, where the logarithm of the offender’s GDP is regressed on a constant,
the logarithm of the complaining victim’s GDP, the logarithm of the disputable trade value, a
dummy that equals one if either the EC or the US are the offender (ECorUSO), a dummy that
equals one if there are multiple complainants in a dispute, and a random disturbance term ε.41
log(GDPO) = α+ β1log(GDPV ) + β2log(DTV ) + δ1ECorUSO + δ2MC1 + ε (2.12)
38On page 572 Guzman and Simmons (2005) argue analogously: “All else equal, the capacity hypothesis suggests
that a capacity-constrained state will be able to pursue only a limited number of cases. The state must prioritize
the list of potential defendants and will tend to pursue larger markets rather than smaller markets. Thus, a low-
capacity complainant may pursue only one case, and that case will be against a defendant with a large market.”.
39See Guzman and Simmons (2005), page 572.
40Note Table 2.4 showing a rather low correlation coefficient of 0.1596 between log(DTV ) and log(GDPO).
41Both dummies are part of the original Guzman and Simmons model.
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Equation 2.12 is estimated on the basis of the 198 complaints for which the vector of disputable
trade values has already been compiled in the preparation of this study’s central (binary) model.
Using feasible general least squares and consistent standard errors, the results of Table 2.9 are
obtained.42 The results show that the estimated coefficients for the victim’s GDP as well as for
Variable Coefficient
Constant 23.3059***
log(GDPV ) 0.0804***
log(DTV ) 0.0422***
ECorUSO 3.4968***
MC1 0.2398**
R2 0.9969
Adjusted R2 0.9968
Akaike 2.1779
Schwarz 2.2609
Observations 198
Table 2.9: Feasible General Least Squares Results for Equation 2.12
the disputable trade value are positive and significant on a one percent level. This change in
the sign of the coefficient for the victim’s GDP means that, all else equal, small countries would
rather complain against small countries than against large countries. Hence it may be the case
that Guzman and Simmons’ result is driven by the omission of the trade value at stake, which
has been found to have a highly significant influence.
2.8 Discussion
From a theoretical perspective, the results may not be too surprising since they mirror the
findings of Kennan and Riezman (1988) who showed that a country can benefit from a tariff
war as compared to free trade if it is only large enough. In the DSS game, it is basically up to
the offender to decide between free trade and a (regulated) tariff war. If the offender is large
enough compared to the victim, he will prefer the tariff war, choose not to comply and take the
potential retaliation into account.
42Again, the estimation is conducted using EViews 5.0.
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Controlling for the value of the disputable commodities and adding a proxy for the retaliatory
capacity of the victim, the theoretical predictions are generally confirmed by the results of a
binary regression model, using data on 195 complaints from 1995 through 2005. One major issue
in the course of the preparation of this study’s data set has been to set up a statistical criterion
to decide which trading partners have been injured. The criterion used here concentrates on
detecting a drop in the relative bilateral trade value of the disputable commodity. Modifications
of this selection criterion leave the estimated coefficients’ signs and significance levels unaffected.
Moreover, the empirical results reproduce the findings of a similar approach by Bown (2005),
who focusses on 54 disputes from 1995 through 2000 for which there is certain information on
the affectedness of victims available.
An additional empirical finding of this study is that one should not expect to observe poor
countries filing complaints just because they are heavily dependent on their (disputable) exports,
even if these exports are very large in terms of their own GDP. In line with theoretical arguments,
the relative value of disputable exports (i.e. DTVGDPV ) does not serve to explain the observed
behavior in the sample.
At first sight, the results of this chapter seem to be contrasting Guzman and Simmons (2005)
who find that a small victim is more likely to file a complaint against a bigger offender than
against an offender of about the same size. However, when controlling for the value of the
disputable commodity at stake, it seems to be the case that Guzman and Simmons’ “David-
against-Goliath-effect” is not driven by country sizes but rather by the omission of the disputable
trade value at stake.
Furthermore, the empirical findings raise implications for a potential bias of the DSS’ usage.
The estimated coefficients of the model predict that the observed set of complainants is biased
towards those cases where the victim is large, the offender is small, the disputable trade value
is high and the victim’s retaliatory capacity is large. Moreover, the disentanglement of the
separate effects of these variables unambiguously suggests that, all else equal, bigger countries
do have a greater incentive than smaller countries to use the DSS.
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While this study answers the question whether the use of the system is biased towards large
countries in the affirmative, it may be complementary to the results of Horn et al. (1999), who
find that the number of product market pairings serves to explain how often a country has been
involved into a dispute. However, their analysis is based on the set of those disputes that have
been notified to the WTO, and from what has been argued in this study, this observable subset
should not be representative but rather biased. Merging these two results suggests that while
the binary decision of whether or not to complain depends upon the identified variables that are
specific to countries and commodities, a country’s frequency with which it faces an infringement
may very well be proportional to the number of bilateral product market pairings.43
43The author cannot imagine a reason for why the number of a country’s product market pairings should
affect the binary decision of whether or not to complain, given a particular offense. However, the number of
infringements a country commits or suffers from may very well be proportional to its product market pairings
if one assumes that offenses occur randomly and separately in each product market pairing. Consequently, a
sequential two step model would be needed to predict the number of a country’s observed participation as a
complainant. In the first step, countries would be offended randomly and proportional to their number of product
market pairings in the spirit of the Horn et al. (1999) approach. In the second step, the binary decision whether
or not to complain against each of these infringements would be made according to the binary decision model
presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
Should WTO Dispute Settlement Be
Subsidized?
Abstract
This chapter is based on Wilckens (2007) and develops a model of the WTO dispute settlement
process to study the proposal of subsidizing litigation costs. The high cost of litigation, so the
argument, is a major obstacle for developing countries to using the DSS to enforce developed
countries’ compliance with WTO rules. The study shows that this proposal may be misguided.
In particular, a reduction of litigation costs may lead economically large countries to impose
larger trade impediments where before they may have raised barriers only a little. Thus, a
cost reduction may even weaken the position of small countries in the DSS. Moreover, the model
sheds light on the structure of the dark figure of un-accused offenses, suggesting that the observed
record of disputes that have been notified to the WTO is systematically biased.
3.1 Introduction
The extremely asymmetric usage of the DSS by high income countries on the one hand and low
income countries on the other hand has been traced back to an institutional bias of the DSS by
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scholars from the fields of economics, law and politics. A prominent proposal to overcome this
supposed bias of the DSS is a reduction of litigation costs.1
Apart from the cost reduction proposal, this chapter analyzes the supposed bias of the
DSS as such. Some empirical studies such as Horn et al. (1999) and Guzman and Simmons
(2005) have already examined whether or not the unbalanced record of disputes with respect
to income groups indicates a systematic bias of the DSS against poorer countries. Although
both papers’ findings basically reject the hypothesis of a biased system, there is reason to
believe that an institutional bias exists, even if it does not show up in the data. As argued in
previous chapters of this dissertation, it is a well established result in trade theory that a larger
country may improve its welfare by offending a trade agreement with a smaller trading partner,
even if the smaller country retaliates.2 Moreover, developed countries tend to be motivated
more strongly by distributional concerns, such as the protection of domestic import substituting
industries. Finally, some scholars conjecture that poorer countries face higher costs associated
with the preparation of a complaint than wealthier countries do.3 In the light of just these
three arguments it should already become questionable that the observed record of disputes is
generated by an unbiased random process. As a matter of fact, up to now there is no information
on the dark figure of disputes, which are those cases where a country experienced a violation
but did not report it to the WTO. Guzman and Simmons (2005) conclude: “In the absence of
a clear sense of how many cases developing countries ‘ought to’ have initiated, we really do not
know whether these filed cases represent equal access or not.”4 Therefore, empirical approaches
that try to shed light on the question of a systemic bias by considering the mere set of observed
disputes, seem to be a dead end.
1The proposals include legal assistance, financial assistance and the introduction of procedurally simplified
“Small Claims” proceedings for complaints of minor value. See for example Busch and Reinhardt (2003) and
Footer (2001).
2Among the first ones to find this result in theory is Johnson (1953), followed by Kennan and Riezman (1988)
with their paper “Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?”. Syropoulos (2002) shows that this finding is a quite
general property of standard trade models.
3See Bown (2005), Guzman and Simmons (2005) and Bush and Reinhardt (2003) who argue that costs play
an important role in the poorer countries’ decision whether or not to file a complaint. See Footer (2001) for a
verbal analysis.
4Guzman and Simmons (2005), page 591.
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The theoretical literature on trade agreements is dominated by the employment of an in-
finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in order to explain a country’s incentive to comply
with or to offend against a trade agreement.5 The common ground of these models is the
assumption that an offense by one of the trading partners leads to non-cooperative behavior
of both trading partners in each of the following periods. As a consequence, existing trade
agreements are assumed and required to be self-enforcing, such that the afore mentioned trigger
strategy successfully deters countries from defecting.6 Thus, in contrast to reality, violation and
retaliation remain off-equilibrium strategies in these models.7
In order to be able to (i) explain the observed occurrence of trade disputes and (ii) analyze
the effects of the proposed reduction of litigation costs, this study takes a different slant by
providing an explicit model of the DSS. The regulations of the DSU, which governs the rules
of retaliation, are taken at face value and applied to a two country tariff setting game. In this
setup, violation does not necessarily have to be an off-equilibrium strategy. It rather depends
upon a country’s size and the pertinent level of litigation costs whether or not a trade agreement
is violated, and whether or not the offended country decides to file a costly complaint.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 starts by presenting the
underlying two country trading environment. After a brief setup of the model’s fundamental
equations, the rules of the sequential tariff setting game are introduced. The setup is completed
by modeling the WTO’s provisions of retaliation. Subsequently, the game is solved via backward
induction, and best response functions are derived in section 3.3. The equilibria of the game are
presented as functions of the country size parameter and litigation costs. Moreover, the proposal
of a reduction of litigation costs is examined in a comparative static analysis. In section 3.4 the
robustness of the results is verified in the course of an extension of the basic model. Section 3.5
5See Bagwell and Staiger (1999) who use a two country approach with an external enforcement assumption.
6Bagwell and Staiger (2002), page 99, note:“The fundamental deterrent to such behavior, and the deterrent
that therefore rests at the foundation of all others, is the fear of initiating a breakdown in the entire cooperative
arrangement and thereby causing a ‘trade war’.”
7See for example Bagwell and Staiger (2001) who analyze the desirability of key WTO principles such as
reciprocity and non-discrimination with respect to the efficiency of trade agreements while they do not allow for
the possibility that a contracting partner violates a trade agreement.
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aims at generalizing the findings to a broader class of trade models. Finally, section 3.6 offers a
discussion of the results, establishes links to the literature, and points out implications for the
dark figure of disputes.
3.2 The Basic Model
The analysis is based on a trade model with two countries (Home and Foreign) and three goods
(x, y and z), which allows for different country or market sizes. The underlying utility functions
are assumed to be quasilinear in both countries: U(x, y, z) = ux(x) + uy(y) + z. While ux and
uy are assumed to be strictly concave, z is assumed to be a numeraire good with price pz fixed
at unity. Labor is the only factor of production. Good z is produced using a constant returns to
scale technology where one unit of labor produces one unit of output. Hence, the wage is fixed
at unity as well. Let trade in the numeraire good be determined residually by the condition of
balanced trade.
For the sake of simplicity I first analyze a model, where both countries differ only in their
demand for one of the two non-numeraire goods. In section 3.4 the analysis is extended to a
more cumbersome model, where demand for both non-numeraire goods is larger in one country.
While the first model is designed to analyze size differences in the market for a particular good,
the second model is designed to analyze differences in country size. However, both models’
results are fairly similar.
3.2.1 Setup of the Trading Environment
Home’s demand functions are obtained from the quasilinear utility function U(x, y, z) = x− x22n+
y− y22 +z, while Foreign’s underlying utility function is given by U∗(x, y, z) = x− x
2
2 +y− y
2
2 +z.
Note that Home receives more (less) utility from the consumption of good x than Foreign if n
is larger (smaller) than unity. An alternative way to think of the setup of this basic model is
to assume two different types of consumers in each country. Consumers of type x only derive
utility from the consumption of good x and the numeraire good, whereas consumers of type y
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only derive utility from the consumption of good y and the numeraire good. Assume then that
Home has n consumers of type x, while Foreign has one consumer of type x and that there is
one consumer of type y in each country.
Home’s demand functions for good x and y are
Dx(px) := (1− px)n, (3.1)
Dy(py) := 1− py. (3.2)
Foreign’s demand functions for good x and y are
D∗x(px) := 1− px, (3.3)
D∗y(py) := 1− py. (3.4)
While both countries have a positive demand for both good x and good y, good x is produced
only by Foreign, whereas good y is produced only by Home8:
S∗x(px) := px, (3.5)
Sy(py) := py. (3.6)
Consequently, Home becomes an importer of good x and an exporter of good y, while Foreign
becomes an importer of good y and an exporter of good x. Note that the two countries are
symmetric except for the multiplicative parameter n, which represents the size of the home
market demand for good x. For n = 1 the two countries would be completely symmetric, while
for n > 1, (n < 1) it holds that Home’s import demand is larger, (smaller) than Foreign’s import
demand.
By assumption, each country’s sole policy variable is a per unit import tariff on its import
8The underlying production functions are assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to scale. The production
functions for x and y are given by x(l) =
√
2l and y(l) =
√
2l respectively, where l denotes labor.
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good. Home’s import tariff on good x is denoted by τ , while Foreign’s import tariff on good
y is denoted by τ∗. After the introduction of tariffs, demand for each country’s import good
is given by Dx(px) := (1 − (px + τ))n and D∗y(py) := 1 − (py + τ∗), respectively. Market
clearing conditions are given by Dx(px, τ) +D∗x(px) = S∗x(px) and Dy(py) +D∗y(py, τ∗) = Sy(py),
respectively. Solving for px and py yields equilibrium world market prices as functions of the
associated import tariffs:
pˆx(τ) =
1 + n(1− τ)
2 + n
, pˆy(τ∗) =
2− τ∗
3
.
Substituting the equilibrium prices into each country’s demand and supply functions yields the
equilibrium quantities9 as functions of the import tariffs:
xˆ(τ) =
n− 2nτ
2 + n
, yˆ(τ∗) =
1− 2τ∗
3
.
Consumer surplus in sector x at Home is ĉsx(τ) =
n(1−2τ)2
2(2+n)2
, and Home’s tariff revenue is t̂r(τ) =
nτ(1−2τ)
2+n . Home’s consumer surplus in sector y is ĉsy(τ
∗) = (1+τ
∗)2
18 . Producer surplus of Home’s
exporting industry is p̂sy(τ∗) =
(τ∗−2)2
18 . All in all, Home’s indirect utility function V depends
upon its own import tariff τ , Foreign’s import tariff τ∗ and the market size parameter n:
V (τ, τ∗, n) =
1
18
(5− 2τ∗ + 2τ∗2 − 9n(2τ − 1)(1 + 2(1 + n)τ)
(2 + n)2
). (3.7)
Foreign’s indirect utility function V ∗ is obtained in an analogous manner. It is as well a function
of Home’s import tariff τ , Foreign’s import tariff τ∗, and the market size parameter n:
V ∗(τ, τ∗, n) =
1
18
(1 + 2τ∗ − 8τ∗2 + 9(2 + 2n+ n
2(1− 2τ + 2τ2))
(2 + n)2
). (3.8)
V and V ∗ are strictly concave in each country’s own tariff and decreasing in the other country’s
9Note that for the hypothetical levels of τ ≥ 1
2
and τ∗ ≥ 1
2
countries would stop trading.
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tariff.10 The pair of optimal tariffs τo and τ∗o is given by:
τo(n) =
n
4 + 4n
, (3.9)
τ∗o =
1
8
. (3.10)
While Foreign’s optimal tariff is a constant, Home’s optimal tariff is an increasing function of its
own market size n.11 This dependency stems from the increasing ability to influence the terms
of trade in one’s favor with increasing market size. From the equations above it is obvious that
Home’s optimal tariff will be lower, (higher) than Foreign’s optimal tariff if n < 1, (n > 1).
Note that so far each country’s optimal tariff is independent of the opponent’s tariff. Interaction
between the tariff choices of both countries will now be established by means of a sequential
game.
3.2.2 Trade Disputes as Sequential Games
Suppose now that there are two WTO members, and that these countries have committed
themselves to an initial free trade agreement. That is, both τ and τ∗ have to be equal to zero in
order to fulfill the agreement. This initial agreement is efficient in the sense that it maximizes
the sum of Home’s and Foreign’s welfare. Under such a type of agreement, countries could be
tempted to violate the agreement by a unilateral increase of their import tariff in order to benefit
from an increase in their own welfare. A typical WTO example for such a situation would be any
WTO member’s obligation to grant every trading partner an import tariff that is lower than or
equal to its Most-Favored-Nation import tariff, while at the same time this particular member
possibly would like to discriminate among its trading partners by setting different import tariffs.
Let Home be the first mover in this sequential game. Then Home will decide whether
to violate the agreement, by raising its tariff above the allowed level, or to comply with the
10See Mathematical Appendix B.1.
11Note that τo(n) → 14 as n → ∞. This property ensures that countries trade positive quantities at positive
prices.
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agreement. Foreign, being the second mover, observes the choice of the first mover. In case
the first mover violates the agreement, the second mover can choose between doing nothing and
filing a complaint at costs c at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in order to be entitled to
retaliate against Home.12
Although the typical dispute settlement process consists of multiple stages, starting with a
request for consultations, via the ruling of panel and appellate body, up to the request for the
suspension of concessions, in this model it is reduced to a single decision of the second mover
(to complain or not to complain).13
The DSU states that “[t]he level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations autho-
rized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or the impairment.”14
While the exact method of calculating the level of nullification or impairment is left to
the discretion of the ruling panel, legal practice is dominated by a counterfactual trade value
approach.15 The trade value approach simply compares price times quantity of the traded
good before and after the implementation of the disputable trade measure. The difference
between these two trade values is seen as the level of nullification or impairment suffered by the
complainant. Or, in terms of the model at hand, the damage to the second mover.
The trade value of Home’s import good, TVx(τ), is simply Home’s import demand times the
equilibrium world market price: TVx(τ) := (Dx(pˆx(τ) + τ))pˆx(τ). Consequently, the change in
the trade value due to an increase in Home’s import tariff is given by ∆TVx(τ) := (Dx(pˆx(τ) +
12Litigation costs can be thought of as incorporating the direct monetary costs of hiring a law firm or a
consulting company in the course of the preparation of the complaint as well as the loss of political goodwill of
the trading partner. Nordstro¨m (2005) emphasizes the role of direct monetary litigation costs and provides data
on its composition.
13This simplification of the legal process is achieved by assuming (i) the presence of perfect information, (ii)
perfect monitoring, and (iii) the absence of legal failure. While perfect monitoring means that a violation of the
trade agreement will always be detected by the harmed victim, the absence of legal failure means that the panel
judges every violation to be a violation.
14DSU Article 22, para 4.
15See Jordan (2005), pages 119-124 for a discussion of the employed calculation methods. The dominating
method used in this paper was employed for example in the following cases: WT/DS26 EC-Hormones, WT/DS27
EC-Bananas, WT/DS160 US-Copyright.
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τ))pˆx(τ)− (Dx(pˆx(0) + 0))pˆx(0). In this model the expression becomes:
∆TVx(τ) =
nτ(2nτ − 2− 3n)
(2 + n)2
. (3.11)
The change in trade value of the foreign import good ∆TVy(τ∗) is obtained by similar means:
∆TVy(τ∗) := (Dy∗(pˆy(τ∗) + τ∗))pˆy(τ∗)− (Dy∗(pˆy(0) + 0))pˆy(0), or:
∆TVy(τ∗) =
2τ∗2 − 5τ∗
9
. (3.12)
The equivalence condition cited above requires that the retaliatory distortion of the trade value
has to be less than or equal to the distortion that was caused by the initial violation. This con-
dition holds if ∆TVy(τ∗) ≤ ∆TVx(τ). Solving this expression for τ∗ yields Foreign’s maximum
admissible tariff as a function of Home’s tariff τ and the market size ratio n. Let this equivalence
restriction on Foreign’s retaliatory tariff be denoted by τ∗eq:
τ∗eq(τ, n) =
10 + 5n−√25(2 + n)2 − 72n(2 + 3n)τ + 144n2τ2
8 + 4n
. (3.13)
The Dispute Settlement System’s equivalence condition thus creates a strategic link between
Home’s violative tariff on imports of good x and Foreign’s retaliatory tariff on imports of good
y.
3.3 Strategic Behavior in the Basic Model
Due to the assumption of perfect information, the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are
found by backward induction, starting with Foreign as the second mover.
3.3.1 The Second Mover’s Best Response
For a given violation of the initial free trade agreement (i.e. τ > 0) Foreign has to make two
decisions. First, how much to retaliate within the permitted interval 0 ≤ τ∗r ≤ τ∗eq. Second,
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whether or not to file a complaint at costs c in order to be entitled to retaliate with a retaliatory
tariff τ∗r .
Earlier calculations have shown that Foreign would maximize its welfare by setting its optimal
tariff τ∗o =
1
8 if it faced an unrestricted optimization problem.
16 However, if the equivalence
condition restricts Foreign’s retaliation to a level below τ∗o , Foreign will completely exploit the
admissible retaliation tariff and set its retaliatory tariff τ∗r equal to τ∗eq(τ, n). Thus, Foreign’s
retaliatory tariff τ∗r is given by:
τ∗r (τ, n) = min{τ∗o , τ∗eq(τ, n)} (3.14)
After having determined the extent of Foreign’s retaliation, I will now analyze whether or not
Foreign will retaliate at all.
Necessary Condition for Retaliation
Foreign will retaliate whenever the welfare gain from retaliation is higher than litigation costs
(i.e. V ∗(τ, τ∗r (τ, n), n) − V ∗(τ, 0, n) > c has to hold). Since the maximum achievable welfare
gain is realized when Foreign implements τ∗o as its retaliatory tariff, it follows that litigation
costs are prohibitively high if c ≥ V ∗(τ, τ∗o , n)− V ∗(τ, 0, n) holds. This condition states that
litigation costs are prohibitive whenever welfare from complaining and retaliating is lower than
welfare from doing nothing, even though the complainant is entitled to set its optimal tariff. The
consequence of such prohibitively high litigation costs would be a breakdown of the strategic
link between Home’s and Foreign’s actions.17 Therefore, the remainder of the analysis focuses
on the case of non-negative and non-prohibitive costs, such that c ∈ [c, c¯) holds, where c stands
for zero costs and c¯ stands for the level of prohibitive costs.18 It follows that c < c¯ is a necessary
16Since Foreign’s welfare is a continuous function of its import tariff τ∗, which is strictly increasing in the interval
between zero and τ∗o , it follows that Foreign’s welfare-maximizing retaliatory tariff τ
∗
r has an upper bound at its
optimal tariff τ∗o .
17Due to perfect information, Home anticipates that Foreign is not retaliating when costs are prohibitive.
Therefore, Home would always play its optimal tariff while Foreign would never retaliate.
18In the model at hand c¯ = 1
144
.
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condition for Foreign to retaliate.
Sufficient Condition for Retaliation
While Foreign’s litigation costs are exogenously determined, the admissible level of Foreign’s
retaliatory tariff τ∗eq(τ, n) depends positively upon the market size ratio n and the level of
Home’s initial violation τ . In other words, the larger the offending country’s market relative
to the offended country’s market and the more severe the offense, the higher will be the level
of permitted retaliation according to the equivalence condition.19 As a consequence, there will
be a set of values of c, n and τ that leads Foreign to be indifferent between retaliating and not
retaliating. Since the model has tariffs as strategic instruments, it is convenient to express the
locus of Foreign’s indifference in terms of Home’s tariff τ . Setting Foreign’s welfare gain from
retaliation equal to litigation costs (c = V ∗(τ, τ∗eq(τ, n), n)−V ∗(τ, 0, n)), one can solve for Home’s
tariff that leads Foreign to be indifferent between retaliating and not retaliating, as a function
of c and n. This indifference-inducing tariff of Home is denoted as τi(c, n) in the following.
τi(c, n) =
12 + 18n−
√
18(4 + n(20 + 17n)) + 18(2 + n)2
√
1− 144c− (2 + n)2144c
24n
Figure 3.1 displays two alternative indifference curves. The upper curve represents the case of
prohibitive costs (i.e. c¯). The lower curve represents a case of c ∈ [c, c¯). Thus, the n-τ -space can
be separated into a Northeastern set of locations where Foreign will retaliate (i.e. τ > τi(c, n))
and a Southwestern set of locations, where Foreign will not retaliate (i.e. τ ≤ τi(c, n)).
The figure reveals that Foreign’s retaliation threshold is lower, the lower the level of litigation
costs is. It also shows that n and τ are “substitutes” from the perspective of Foreign, who is
eventually interested in the level of admissible retaliation. In other words, a Home country with
a small market, raising its import tariff steeply, could cause the same ∆TVx (which translates
19Formally the benefit from retaliating is increasing in the market size of the offender (
∂V ∗(τ,τ∗r (τ,n),n)
∂n
> 0) and
increasing in the severity of the offense (
∂V ∗(τ,τ∗r (τ,n),n)
∂τ
> 0) for any given non-prohibitive level of litigation costs
and as long as τ∗eq(τ, n) < τ
∗
o (i.e. the equivalence condition must be binding) holds.
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Figure 3.1: Foreign Indifference Inducing Home Tariffs
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into the admissible retaliation tariff) as a Home country with a large market which raises its
import tariff only slightly.
As a summary, Foreign’s best response τˆ∗ for non-prohibitive costs is given by:
τˆ∗ =

0 iff τ ≤ τi(c, n)
τ∗r (n, τ) iff τ > τi(c, n)
(3.15)
3.3.2 The First Mover’s Best Response
Home sets its tariff anticipating the consequences of doing so in terms of whether or not there
will be any retaliation and in terms of the extent of a possible retaliation. Note that Home’s
welfare as a function of its import tariff τ is no longer a continuous function, not even for the
set of non-prohibitive tariffs. Home’s welfare will now have a step at the point where Foreign
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switches between retaliating and not retaliating due to an incremental increase in Home’s offense.
Therefore, one has to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether Foreign retaliates or
not. In the following, offenses triggering retaliation (i.e. τ > τi(c, n)) will be referred to as major
offenses, while smaller levels of violation which do not trigger retaliation (i.e. 0 < τ ≤ τi(c, n))
will be referred to as minor offenses. Consider Figure 3.2 where the bold indifference curve
Figure 3.2: Home’s Tariff Levels
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represents τi for prohibitive costs (i.e. c¯), while the thin indifference curve represents c ∈ [c, c¯),
and the dashed upward sloping curve depicts Home’s optimal tariff. Three sets of dominated
strategies can be ruled out right from the start.
Lemma 3.1. Home never plays a tariff of τ > τo(n).
Clearly all combinations of τ and n located above Home’s optimal tariff (set I in Figure 3.2)
can be excluded from further analysis for the simple reason that the choice of all these locations
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is strictly dominated by choosing τo(n).
Lemma 3.2. Home never plays a tariff of τ < τo(n) ∧ τ < τi(c, n).
For all tariffs located in set II, Home could raise its tariff, thereby getting closer to its
optimal tariff, without triggering retaliation since Foreign would only retaliate if the retaliation
threshold was exceeded. Hence this set of tariffs is strictly dominated by τo(n) for n ≤ noi(c)
and by τi(c, n) for n > noi(c), where noi(c) denotes value of n at the intersection of τo(n) and
τi(c, n).20
Lemma 3.3. Home never plays a tariff of τi(c¯, n) ≤ τ < τo(n).
Consider Set III and recall that τi(c¯, n) is the set of n-τ -combinations that entitles Foreign
to retaliate exactly with its optimal tariff τ∗o =
1
8 . Hence, any n-τ -combination located above
τi(c¯, n) triggers the same amount of retaliation since Foreign’s maximum retaliatory capacity
is already exhausted. Therefore, all these n-τ -combinations are strictly dominated by playing
τo(n).
A general property of the model is the finding that it does not pay for Home to commit
an offense against a larger country, which mirrors the findings of Johnson (1953), Kennan and
Riezman (1988), and Syropoulos (2002).
Lemma 3.4. Given Foreign retaliates elastically, Home prefers to commit a minor offense for
all n ≤ 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.3.
Home’s remaining options are (i) to play its optimal tariff τo(n), yielding welfare of Vo(n) :=
V (τo(n), τ∗o , n), (ii) to play the current retaliation threshold τi(c, n), yielding welfare of Vi(c, n) :=
V (τi(c, n), 0, n) and (iii) to play a tariff τ§(n) which maximizes Home’s welfare given that Foreign
retaliates elastically (which can only occur iff τi(c, n) < τ < τi(c¯, n)), yielding welfare of V§(n) :=
20The subscript “oi” should remind the reader of the fact that noi denotes the critical market size where Home
switches from playing τo(n) to playing τi(c, n). The existence and the properties of this lower switching point
noi(c) are examined in the Mathematical Appendix B.2.
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V (τ§(n), τ∗eq(τ§(n), n), n).21 It is possible to show that option (iii) will only be considered by
Home for an extremely narrow set of n-c-combinations. A necessary condition for playing τ§(n)
is c ≤ 0.03086c¯ and 1 < n ≤ 1.40231. Since the tariff level τ§(n) as well as the associated
welfare level V§(n) are extremely close to τi(c, n) and Vi(c, n) in this particular region, further
analysis of this option will be omitted.22 Home’s welfare under the two relevant strategies is
Figure 3.3: Home’s Welfare Levels
1.5 2 2.5 3
n
V
),( ncVi
)(nVo
1
)(cnio
↑c
↓c
),( ncVi
),( ncVi
)(cnio)(cnio
cost-elastic range
depicted in Figure 3.3. The dashed curve represents Vo(n), which is Home’s welfare when both
Home and Foreign play their optimal tariffs. The three continuous curves represent Vi(c, n) for
different cost-levels. The upper bold continuous curve is associated with prohibitive costs. The
lower bold continuous curve is associated with zero costs, while the finer continuous curve in
21The subscript § should remind the reader of the fact that this tariff is associated with a major offense that
triggers retaliation according to a binding equivalence condition. See Mathematical Appendix B.3 for derivation
and properties of τ§(n).
22Formally, one could rule out τ§(n) by assuming c > 0.03086c¯. See Mathematical Appendix B.4.
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the middle represents intermediate costs.23 nio(c) denotes the value of n where Vi(c, n) crosses
Vo(n) from above.24 In other words, nio(c) is the critical country size where Home switches from
committing a minor offense to committing a major offense.
Since the case of no costs and the case of prohibitive costs constitute natural boundaries
to the shifting range of Vi(c, n), Figure 3.3 already reveals that Home’s choice between the two
strategies is completely independent of litigation costs for some “exterior” values of n, while it
depends upon them for some “interior” values of n. Hence the following proposition distinguishes
between three areas of n.
Proposition 3.1. Home’s best response tariff is dependent upon n in the following way:
(i) For all n ≤ 1.38504, Home commits a minor offense.
(ii) For all n > 2.46187, Home commits a major offense.
(iii) For all 1.38504 < n ≤ 2.46187, Home’s decision between a major and a minor offense is
dependent upon the level of litigation costs. Paradoxically, high litigation costs lead to a
minor offense, while low litigation costs lead to a major offense.
Proof: See Mathematical Appendix B.5.
To understand the intuition for the first part of Proposition 3.1, recall that Lemma 3.1
and Lemma 3.2 state that the smallest countries (i.e. n ≤ noi(c)) can play their optimal tariff
without harming their trading partners enough to trigger a complaint. Moreover, countries of
size noi(c) < n ≤ 1.38504 prefer to restrict their tariff to τi(c, n) in order not to trigger retaliation
since Vo(n) < Vi(c, n) holds in this interval of n.
The second part of Proposition 3.1 basically states that very large Home countries which
exceed a particular size, find it more beneficial to commit a major offense by playing τo(n) and
taking Foreign’s retaliation into account, than to restrict their offense to the maximum tolerated
23Note that costs are a shift parameter of Vi(c, n), while Vo(n) is independent of costs.
24The subscript “io” should remind the reader of the fact that nio denotes the critical country size where Home
switches from playing τi(γ, n) to playing τo(n).
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offense level of τi(c, n). This result follows from the finding that Vo(n) > Vi(c, n) holds in this
interval of n.
The third part of Proposition 3.1 refers to Home countries whose n lies between the two just
described boundaries. In this interval of n, the location of the switching point nio(c) is dependent
upon the pertinent level of litigation costs. Figure 3.3 shows that nio(c) lies the more to the left
(right) of the bounded interval, the lower (higher) litigation costs are. This means that lowering
litigation costs will lead even smaller countries than before to committing a major offense, while
increasing litigation costs will deter even larger countries than before from committing a major
offense. The economic reason for this behavior can be explained by considering Figure 3.2 again.
Note that the gap between τi(c, n) and τo(n) widens with increasing market size. This means
that the opportunity cost of playing the threshold tariff τi(c, n) is increasing in n since τi(c, n)
is decreasing in n while τo(n) is increasing in n.25 Consequently, there is a switching point in
terms of n where Home’s opportunity costs of avoiding retaliation will equal Home’s costs from
taking retaliation into account. At this point Home will switch from playing τi(c, n) to playing
τo(n).
To summarize, Home’s best response τˆ is given by:
τˆ =

τo(n) if n ≤ noi(c)
τi(c, n) iff noi(c) < n ≤ nio(c)
τo(n) if n > nio(c)
(3.16)
Stated verbally:
1. The smallest Home countries will play their optimal tariff because they do not cause enough
damage to trigger retaliation.
2. Home countries of intermediate market size will restrict their tariff to a level below their
optimal tariff in order to avoid retaliation by bothering Foreign no more than the latter’s
25For Vo(n), it can be shown that
∂Vo(n)
∂n
> 0 and ∂
2Vo(n)
∂2n
< 0. See Mathematical Appendix B.6.
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tolerance level.
3. The biggest Home countries will play their optimal tariffs and take Foreign’s retaliation
into account.
3.3.3 Equilibria
Combining Home’s and Foreign’s best responses, Nash equilibrium behavior may be expressed
just as a function of c and n. Let the pair of Nash equilibrium tariffs be denoted by (τN , τ∗N ).
Figure 3.4 shows that the c-n-space is divided into four areas of different equilibria. The grey
Figure 3.4: Equilibria
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area to the northwest of Figure 3.4 represents a trade war between the two countries, where each
country is playing its optimal tariff. This type of equilibrium occurs if Home is large enough to
be willing to put up with Foreign’s retaliation.
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The white area in the center of Figure 3.4 represents the equilibria in which Home bothers
Foreign just so much that retaliation is avoided. The economic intuition for the existence of
this type of equilibrium is that either Home is not large enough to be willing to put up with
retaliation, or Home’s opportunity costs of a minor offense are relatively low, which is the case
if litigation costs are relatively high.26 Note that both afore-mentioned types of equilibria only
exist for non-prohibitive costs.
The striped area, which stretches to the south and along the eastern edge of Figure 3.4
represents the set of equilibria where Home plays its optimal tariff while Foreign does not
retaliate. This type of equilibrium occurs if either Home is not large enough in order to harm
Foreign sufficiently (the cases at the southern edge), or costs are prohibitive (the cases at the
eastern edge where c ≥ c¯ holds).
The small checkered area to the west of Figure 3.4 depicts those rare cases where Home
commits a major offense by playing τ§(n) while Foreign retaliates according to the binding
equivalence condition.
3.3.4 Comparative Statics in Litigation Costs
Finally, the comparative static effects of a reduction of litigation costs can be analyzed by
consulting Figure 3.4 again. It is useful to distinguish between a cost reduction that passes the
threshold of prohibitive costs on the one hand, and a cost reduction that occurs within the range
of non-prohibitive costs on the other hand.
Prohibitive Initial Costs
Consider the case where initial litigation costs are prohibitive (i.e. c ≥ c¯). Then the initial
equilibrium tariff pair is given by (τo(n), 0). The effects of a reduction of litigation costs to a
level just an increment below the prohibitive threshold of c¯ are dependent upon the pertinent
level of n.
26The opportunity costs of a minor offense are Home’s forgone benefits from a tariff increase to τo(n), consti-
tuting a major offense.
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For high values of n (i.e. n ≥ nio(c¯)), Home’s tariff is left unchanged, although Foreign
implements retaliation of τ∗o .
In the case of an intermediate level of n (i.e. 1 ≤ n < nio(c¯)), Home’s compliance is improved
since the post reduction tariff pair is (τi(c, n), 0).
In the case of a small level of n (i.e. n < 1) both countries’ tariffs and welfare levels are left
unchanged.
Non-prohibitive Initial Costs
Now consider the case where initial non-prohibitive litigation costs (i.e. c < c¯) are further
reduced.
For high values of n, where the initial set of equilibrium tariffs is (τo(n), τ∗o ), a reduction of
litigation costs will have no effect at all, and the equilibrium does not change.
Suppose the initial equilibrium set of tariffs was (τi(c, n), 0), which corresponds to any loca-
tion inside the white area in the center of Figure 3.4. In this case the effects depend even further
on n. If n ≤ 1, the reduction in litigation costs does not change the equilibrium strategies as
such since the post reduction equilibrium strategies are again (τi(c, n), 0). Nevertheless, Home
will set a lower tariff because the absolute level of τi(c, n) has been reduced in the course of the
cost reduction. If, to the contrary n > 1, the cost reduction may cause more severe offenses.
Either Home commits a more severe offense by switching to its optimal tariff τo(n) or to τ§(n),
thereby triggering Foreign’s retaliation. Note that this paradoxical effect can only occur if the
offender is sufficiently large (i.e. n > 1).
Suppose the initial equilibrium set of tariffs was (τo(n), 0), which corresponds to the striped
area at the southern edge of Figure 3.4. In this case a reduction of costs unambiguously improves
Home’s compliance, who switches from playing τo(n) to playing τi(c, n) while Foreign’s tariff
remains zero. Thus, the reduction of litigation costs may succeed in forcing countries into
compliance by rendering retaliation more attractive. Note that this intuitive effect only shows
up in the case of sufficiently small offenders (i.e. n ≤ 1).
63
3.4 Extension
3.4.1 Rationale and Model Adaptations
In order to analyze if the results of the first model are robust to variations, this subsection
models the asymmetry of the two countries in a different way while the structure of the analysis
remains unchanged. Throughout this section the emphasis is put on highlighting the crucial
differences that result from the changed specifications.
Suppose the representative consumers’ quasilinear utility functions were identical in both
countries.27 Suppose further that Foreign has one consumer while Home has n identical con-
sumers. Consequently, demand at Home is now n times foreign demand in both sectors. Demand
at Home is then given by:
Dx(px) := (1− px)n, (3.17)
Dy(py) := (1− py)n. (3.18)
Foreign’s demand is given by:
D∗x(px) := 1− px, (3.19)
D∗y(py) := 1− py. (3.20)
Again Foreign supplies only good x while Home supplies only good y:
S∗x(px) := px, (3.21)
Sy(py) := py. (3.22)
Equilibrium prices, quantities, welfare levels and optimal tariffs are obtained in an analogous
manner to the calculations conducted in the first model. However, unlike before, Foreign’s
27Let utility for a representative consumer be given by: U(x, y, z) = U∗(x, y, z) = x− x2
2
+ y − y2
2
+ z. Again
trade is balanced via the numeraire good z.
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optimal tariff τ∗o (n) is now a function of n. It is given by: τ∗o (n) =
1
3+4n+n2
. Note that Foreign’s
optimal tariff now clearly decreases in n since Foreign’s ability to influence world market prices
and hence its ability to generate terms of trade gains deteriorates with increasing n.
The rules of the tariff setting game and the modeling of the WTO’s Equivalence Condition
remain unchanged.
3.4.2 The Second Mover’s Best Response
Again Foreign’s welfare is a continuous function of its import tariff τ∗, which is positive and
strictly increasing in the interval between zero and τ∗o (n). Thus, Foreign’s retaliatory tariff τ∗r
is given by τ∗r (τ, n) = min{τ∗o (n), τ∗eq(τ, n)}.
Necessary Condition for Retaliation
Litigation costs c are prohibitive if c ≥ V ∗(τ, τ∗o (n), n)− V ∗(τ, 0, n) is satisfied. Substituting
explicit values yields prohibitive costs c¯ as a function of n:
c¯(np) =
1
2(2 + np)2(3 + 4np + n2p)
. (3.23)
The subscript p is appended to the country size parameter n in order to be able to identify
the cases where costs are prohibitive in terms of country size.28 Equation 3.23 reveals that an
increase in litigation costs leads to a decrease of the threshold where costs have a prohibitive
effect in terms of country size (i.e. ∂c¯(np)∂np < 0). Since c¯(np) is a continuous and monotonically
decreasing function, it holds that n < np is a necessary condition for retaliation.29
28If e.g. np = 2, Foreign would not complain against offenses committed by countries of size n ≥ 2, no matter
how severe the offenses may be.
29For c¯(np) the following properties can be shown to hold:
c¯(np)

< c¯(n) iff np > n
= c¯(n) iff np = n
> c¯(n) iff np < n
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Sufficient Condition for Retaliation
Foreign will only retaliate if the welfare gain associated with the implementation of its retaliatory
tariff τ∗r (τ, n) exceeds litigation costs. Thus there will be a set of combinations of τ , n, and np
which leads Foreign to be indifferent between retaliating and not retaliating. The set of these
indifference inducing combinations can be expressed in terms of Home’s tariff τi(np, n), which is
again a function of costs (already expressed in terms of the prohibitive country size ratio np) and
country size. Figure 3.5 illustrates that the thin hook-shaped τi(np, n)-curve only runs up to the
Figure 3.5: Foreign Indifference Inducing Home Tariffs in the Extended Model
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level of n where n = np since τi(np, n) does not exist for prohibitive costs (i.e. n ≥ np). This
indifference curve separates the n-τ -space into two different strategic sections. Combinations of
τ and n lying to the Southwest (i.e. low τ and low n) or to the East (i.e. n ≥ np) of the curve
will not trigger foreign retaliation, whereas combinations of τ and n lying above the curve will
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trigger foreign retaliation.
The bold downward sloping curve labeled τ(n) represents all combinations in the n-τ -space
where the authorized retaliatory tariff τ∗eq(τ, n) equals Foreign’s optimal tariff τ∗o (n).30 Economi-
cally this means that Foreign’s retaliation is inelastic in Home’s initial violation for combinations
of n and τ that lie above the τ(n)-curve since Foreign will never retaliate with a tariff that is
higher than its optimal tariff.
3.4.3 The First Mover’s Best Response
The perfectly informed Home country decides between committing a minor offense (i.e. τ ≤
τi(np, n)), which does not trigger retaliation, and a major offense (i.e. τ > τi(np, n)), which does
trigger retaliation.31 Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3, and Lemma 3.4 can be shown to hold
analogously in this model specification. Consequently the sets labeled I, II and III in Figure 3.6
constitute strictly dominated strategies for the same reasons as in the previous model.
Once more Home’s remaining options are (i) to play its optimal tariff τo(n), (ii) to play
the retaliation threshold tariff τi(np, n) and (iii) to play a tariff τ§(n), which maximizes Home’s
welfare given that Foreign retaliates elastically. Again the third option will be dominated by
playing one of the other two tariffs except for the occurrence of a very narrow range of country
size ratios and costs. Consequently further analysis of this option is omitted for the same reasons
as in the previous model. For the sake of completeness it can be shown that the Home will only
play τ§(n) if costs are extremely low (i.e. np ≥ 3.7480) and if 1 < n ≤ 1.2128.
The critical country size ratio nio(np) where Home switches from committing a minor offense
to committing a major offense can be derived along the lines of the calculations in the previous
model.32
30Analytically τ(n) is obtained by setting τ∗eq(τ, n) equal to τ
∗
o (n) and solving for τ .
31Note that now τi(np, n) does not exist for n > np, since costs are prohibitive in these cases. Therefore it
seems reasonable to count as well those violative tariffs as major offenses where Home plays its optimal tariff
because costs are prohibitive.
32Again the switching points between the three sections of Home’s best response function are obtained by
substituting Home’s possible offensive tariffs and Foreign’s associated retaliatory tariffs pairwise into Home’s
welfare function. The two resulting welfare functions of Home are given by:
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Figure 3.6: Home’s Tariff Levels in the Extended Model
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Proposition 3.2. Home’s best response tariff is dependent upon n in the following way:
(i) For all n ≤ 1.21280, Home commits a minor offense.
(ii) For all n > 1.60254, Home commits a major offense.
(iii) For all 1.21280 < n ≤ 1.60254, Home’s decision between a major and a minor offense is
dependent upon the level of litigation costs. Paradoxically, high litigation costs lead to a
minor offense, while low litigation costs lead to a major offense.
Proof: See Mathematical Appendix B.7.
The paradoxical result that a reduction of litigation costs may lead even smaller countries
than before to committing a major offense holds as well in this model. Just like before the shifting
1. Vo(n) = V (τo(n), τ
∗
o (n), n) and
2. Vi(np, n) = V (τi(np, n), 0, n).
These welfare functions are set equal to each other and solved for n in order to obtain the switching point nio(np).
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range of nio(np) has a boundary above (at n = 1.60254) and below (at n = 1.21280) at absolute
levels of country size, while it is cost-elastic only between these boundaries. Consequently,
countries of size n ≤ 1.21280 will never play τo(n), countries of size n > 1.60254 will always play
τo(n), while countries of size 1.21280 < n ≤ 1.60254 will play either τo(n) or τi(np, n) depending
upon the pertinent level of litigation costs.
3.4.4 Equilibria
Figure 3.7 shows the occurrence of three different subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy
pairs (τN , τ∗N ) in the np-n-space.
33 The diagonal line starting at the origin, has a slope of one. It
Figure 3.7: Equilibria in the Extended Model
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divides the np-n-space into one northwestern triangular shaped set, where n > np holds and one
southeastern triangular shaped set, where n < np holds. Clearly all np-n-combinations in the
33Recall that a high (low) level of np corresponds to a low (high) level of litigation costs.
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northwestern set exhibit prohibitive costs, such that the equilibrium in this triangular is given
by (τo(n), 0). This tariff pair constitutes as well an equilibrium in the striped area lying to the
southeast of the 45-degree line and to the south of the noi(np)-curve. Although costs are not
prohibitive in this area, the offense and therefore the permitted level of retaliation is not large
enough to let Foreign break even with litigation costs.
The white area represents all combinations of np and n leading to an equilibrium tariff pair
of (τi(np, n), 0). This area is bordered to the southwest by noi(np), to the southeast by nio(np)
and to the west by the condition of non-prohibitive costs (i.e. the 45-degree line).
The northeastern grey area represents a trade war equilibrium with both countries playing
their optimal tariffs. It is bordered to the south by nio(np) and to the west by the condition of
non-prohibitive costs.
3.5 Generalization
Let VM be any country’s welfare from setting its best major offense tariff and let V m be its
welfare from setting its best minor offense tariff. Consider that V m is a function of litigation
costs, while VM is not.
Lemma 3.5. A reduction in litigation costs weakly decreases V m while it does not affect VM .
Note that Lemma 3.5 implies that a reduction in litigation costs cannot render a minor
offense more attractive. Hence, it can already be ruled out that countries switch from a major
offense to a minor offense in the course of a cost reduction.
Assumption 3.1. Let V be a function of the country-specific parameter ω, where d(V
M−Vm)
dω > 0
for all ω ∈ (ω, ω¯). Moreover, let
(i) VM = V m|c for all ω = ω0,
(ii) VM > V m|c for all ω > ω0,
(iii) VM < V m|c∈[c,c¯) for all ω < ω0,
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where ω < ω0 < ω¯.
In words, Assumption 3.1 states that a country prefers a trade war for higher values of ω
while it prefers to commit a minor offense for lower values of ω.
Building on Lemma 3.5, consider the consequences of a reduction in litigation costs, as stated
by the next proposition.
Proposition 3.3. In every model that satisfies Assumption 3.1, a reduction of litigation costs
c features the following effects.
(i) In the subset ω ∈ (ω0, ω¯] a country whose best response has been a minor offense before
the cost reduction sets a strictly higher tariff by switching from a minor offense to a major
offense if the reduction of c is sufficiently strong. A country whose best response has been
a major offense before the cost reduction will not be affected.
(ii) In the subset ω ∈ [ω, ω0) a country sticks to a minor offense for any reduction in c. Thereby
it sets a strictly lower tariff.
Proof: See Appendix B.8.
Proposition 3.3 shows that asking for the practical relevance of this model’s paradoxical
finding is equivalent to asking for the practical relevance of Assumption 3.1. Recall that As-
sumption 3.1 just states that there is some critical value of the country-specific parameter ω,
denoted by ω0, above which it pays to trigger a trade war, while it does not pay for lower values
of ω. In this chapter’s models, the country-size and market-size parameter n has been shown
to satisfy Assumption 3.1. However, there are various modeling approaches that may satisfy
Assumption 3.1 as the literature review in section 1.3 already revealed. In general, a country
may prefer a tariff war to free trade if either distributional concerns, such as a high weight on
import-competing producer’s well-being and/or on tariff revenue, or the ability to influence the
terms of trade in it’s favor are strong enough to offset the deadweight loss associated with a
tariff war.
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Kennan and Riezman (1988) consider a two country trade model where they use differences
in countries’ endowments to model asymmetry. They find that a country prefers a tariff war to
free trade if its share of global endowments is sufficiently high while it prefers free trade in case
of a lower endowment share. Thus their approach is in agreement with Assumption 3.1.
Syropoulos (2002) uses a Heckscher-Ohlin type model where countries differ in their popu-
lation, i.e. in their labour force. He finds that sufficiently large countries prefer a tariff war to
free trade, thereby satisfying Assumption 3.1.
Melatos et al. (2007) show that Assumption 3.1 may as well be satisfied in a model setup
where countries’ preferences exhibit different degrees of substitutability. In simulations the au-
thors show that a smaller country may even prefer a trade war against a larger country if the
preferences of the smaller country’s population exhibit a sufficiently high degree of substitutabil-
ity.
In a modified conference paper version of this chapter, Wilckens (2008) uses a two country
setting, that is similar to the setting of Bown (2002), where countries exhibit different political
economy parameters in their welfare functions. Wilckens (2008) shows that a country with a
sufficiently strong preference for protecting its import-competing industry prefers a tariff war,
while a less protectionist country prefers to avoid a tariff war.
3.6 Discussion
The outcomes of the models suggest that the DSS is unable to level out existing imbalances in
countries’ incentives to impose violative import tariffs. This finding is based on the fact that a
country’s ability to enforce a trade agreement under the rules of the DSS depends crucially upon
the country’s incentive to implement retaliatory tariffs. So far, this result parallels the result of
Bown (2002) who uses a similar constraint on the victim’s admissible level of retaliation, but
allows for the possibility of compensation between the countries to avoid a dispute.34 Further-
34Note that Bown (2002) does neither consider any litigation costs nor does he allow the offender to optimize
its illegal tariff given the restriction on the victim’s level of retaliation.
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more, litigation costs have been found to be a key determinant of a violated country’s decision
whether or not to file a complaint. The central results have been found to be of importance
for a broad class of models, as argued in the section on the generalization of the results. In
particular, with respect to the decision whether or not to violate a trade agreement, asymme-
try in countries’ re-distributional motivation is equivalent to asymmetry in countries’ ability to
influence the terms of trade in their favor.35
The results have been employed to analyze the effects of a reduction of litigation costs. The
findings suggest that a reduction of litigation costs succeeds in improving compliance of small
countries. However, large countries may be led to commit more severe offenses.36
Besides, a reduction of litigation costs is supposed to lead to more trade disputes surfacing
in the dispute settlement record and to cause an increase in the implementation of retaliation
at the same time.
Another result of the model is related to the question whether or not the usage of the dispute
settlement system is biased. The model predicts that a country is more likely to file a complaint
if it (i) has a high retaliatory capacity or incentive, (ii) faces low litigation costs, and (iii) suf-
fers from an offense at a relatively high level. While these theoretical findings may explain the
dominance of large or rich, and protectionist countries in the dispute settlement record, they
mean at the same time that the observable sample of reported disputes is biased in favor of
countries with these particular characteristics. Therefore, the finding of Horn et al. (1999),
which suggests that disputes occur randomly and proportional to the number of a country’s
product-market-pairings, may still be correct. However, in the light of the model at hand, the
number of a country’s product-market-pairings should no longer be seen as the central reason
for the occurrence of a dispute, but rather as a side effect, that may be positively correlated with
the real drivers of offenses and complaints which are a country’s retaliatory capacity, litigation
35In reality, a country’s tariff setting incentive should be a function of both, the ability to influence the terms of
trade and the degree of re-distributional concerns as empirical studies like Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Broda
et al. (2006) suggest.
36This result parallels findings of the Economics of Crime literature. See for example Becker (1968), who shows
that an intensified punishment may lead some offenders to switch to more severe offenses, while it may reduce
the offensive level of others.
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costs and the intensity of violation. Hence the theory suggests that the observable sample of
disputes does not reflect the country-specific characteristics of the unobservable population of
disputes. Therefore the unreported offenses (i.e. the dark figure of offenses) should contain a dis-
proportionately large share of countries lacking retaliatory capacity, facing high litigation costs,
and being offended against at lower intensity. This typically applies to developing countries.
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Chapter 4
Tradable Retaliation in the WTO
Abstract
Under the WTO’s current DSS, the utmost threat to an offender of a trade agreement is posed
by the authorization of the successful complainant to implement retaliatory measures against
him. This enforcement threat may be less effective when the complaining victim is a small
or a developing country that lacks the ability to retaliate. In order to overcome this supposed
enforcement flaw of smaller and poorer countries, the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the WTO
proposed to allow the retaliatory right to be traded. In this chapter, which is joint work with
Mathis Klepper,1 we analyze the effects of this proposal on the World Trading System in an
asymmetric three country model. In different scenarios we distinguish whether or not the initial
offender is allowed to buy the retaliatory right. We show that, irrespective of the inclusion of
the offender, compliance with the rules of the WTO is unambiguously improved, and that this
improvement is strongest in the case of small country victims.
1Neither one of us did focus exclusively on certain aspects of this study. We worked jointly on each part.
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4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapters, a panel’s sole possibility to exert pressure on a non-
complying country is to authorize a victorious complainant to impose retaliatory measures
against the offender. Thus, the magnitude of the ultimate enforcement threat depends upon the
victorious complainant’s ability to impose countermeasures against the non-complying offender.
As already highlighted in previous chapters, there is clear evidence in the literature suggesting
that this ability varies considerably between large and small countries.2
In November 2002 the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the WTO (2002) proposed to make
retaliatory rights tradable in order to address the problem that smaller countries may face
difficulties in retaliating. With respect to this proposal, the Mexicans conjecture that “[f ]acing
a more realistic possibility of being the subject of suspended concessions, the infringing Member
will be more inclined to bring its measure into conformity.”
There is some recent research on this proposal by Bagwell et al. (2007). The authors assume
that an offense against a country has already occurred. The victim of this initial offense is unable
to use the retaliatory right and thus seeks to sell it. There are at least two potentially buying
countries. Each of these countries maximizes its welfare function where producers’ surplus is
weighted by a political economy parameter, which is drawn from a random distribution. While
each country knows the realization of its own parameter, it does not observe the realization of
the other countries’ parameters. In this particular setting of imperfect information, the authors
find that if the initial offender is not allowed to buy the right, it may happen that none of the
2First of all, the optimal tariff of many developing countries is likely to be close to zero since most of these
countries cannot influence their terms of trade. Hence, scholars denote this as a “shooting oneself in the foot”
effect. Secondly, even if a small and poor country imposed retaliatory tariffs, these are most likely to constitute a
threat that is insufficient to enforce an offender’s compliance if the offender is large. Recall that on the theoretical
side, Johnson (1953), Kennan and Riezman (1988) and Syropoulos (2002) have shown that a country may gain
from a tariff war if it is powerful enough compared to its opponent, where “powerful” may refer to the level of
population, endowments or the price elasticities of import demand and export supply. On the empirical side there
are some studies that come up with evidence in support of these theoretical findings. Broda et al. (2006) show
that countries actually do tend to take their market power into account when setting import tariffs. Recall that
Bown (2005) and the study in chapter 2 show by means of a probit regression analysis that smaller and poorer
countries are less likely to file a complaint against an offender. Furthermore, both studies find that the size of the
offender is detrimental to a victim’s incentive to file a complaint.
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potentially retaliating countries buys and uses the retaliatory right.3 This result is driven by
the existence of a positive externality. In particular, when political economy parameters are
low, countries may prefer not to impose retaliation themselves. Then countries may prefer to
get a free ride on another country’s retaliation which drives down the world market price of
their imports. However, when Bagwell et al. (2007) allow as well the initial offender to buy the
retaliatory right, the latter will always buy and retire the right.
Their setting involves several particular features which are crucial for their findings that
(i) the retaliatory right may be misallocated between the bidders and the victim and (ii) no
retaliation at all may occur as a special case of misallocation.
First of all, the assumption that the initial owner of the retaliatory right is completely unable
to use it, is crucial for the the finding that no retaliation at all may occur. If, to the contrary,
the initial owner was able to reap at least a minimum welfare gain from the implementation of
the right, retaliation would always be executed, even if no other country submitted a bid. Since
the DSU4 even allows for cross-retaliation (i.e. retaliation may be implemented in a sector other
than the sector of the initial violation), we contribute a setting in which a violated country is
not completely unable to utilize a retaliatory right.
The finding of Bagwell et al. (2007) that the retaliatory right may be misallocated in the basic
auction, which is the auction where the offender is not allowed to bid, builds on the existence of
a non-negative reserve price. Restricting the reserve price, and therefore as well the winning bid,
to the set of non-negative numbers implies that, unlike the other countries, the victim does not
benefit from the positive terms of trade externality. We could rather imagine that the victim,
who obviously is a trading partner of the offending country, would benefit from the positive
externality that emerges from the implementation of retaliation via a lower world market price
3Bagwell et al. (2007) consider a sealed bid first price auction. In this particular setting a country’s optimal
strategy may be not to bid when its political economy parameter is sufficiently low. As a result, the retaliatory
right remains with the victim and no retaliation occurs. This special case of misallocation of the retaliatory right
is denoted as auction failure in Bagwell et al. (2007).
4Article 22,3 of the DSU states: “In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the com-
plaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures:[...] (b) if that party considers that it is not
practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek
to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;”.
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of the offender’s export goods. Thus, the victim would be likely to have a positive willingness
to pay in order to ensure that retaliation will actually be implemented.5
What strikes us is that the Mexican proposal rather addresses the type of North-South
trade disputes, where the Southern country finds it difficult to retaliate, than the type of trade
disputes between two developed countries which both could implement retaliation easily. As
Bagwell et al. (2007) put it on page 310: “One prominent problem is the practical difficulty
faced by small and developing countries in finding the capacity to retaliate effectively against
trading partners that are in violation of their WTO commitments.”6 Of course in reality both,
redistributive considerations as well as terms of trade considerations are likely to influence
a country’s tariff-setting incentive. While Bagwell et al. (2007) emphasize the redistributive
considerations by using a model with asymmetric political economy parameters, we contribute
a model where countries differ in their size in order to focus on terms of trade considerations
and hence more on typical North-South issues.
The imperfect information setting in Bagwell et al. (2007) prevents bidders from communi-
cating their valuations and thus from internalizing the positive externality between bidders. In
our model of perfect information the potential retaliators agree that the larger country should
execute the right since the larger country can influence the world market price of the retaliatory
good more effectively, thus creating a larger terms of trade gain for all importers of the retalia-
tion good. Hence, even in the presence of a positive externality, the allocation of the retaliatory
right turns out to be efficient in our model.
Apart from that, we respond to the suggestion of Bagwell et al. (2007) by offering a first
analysis of how a restriction on the maximum admissible level of retaliation would change the
results.
The remainder of this chapter starts with the setup of the underlying trade model and our
5So what does this victim country in Bagwell et al. (2007) look like? It is either a country that is so small
that it cannot influence world market prices or it has a rather low political economy parameter in order to be
completely unable to retaliate. In addition it does neither import any good that is exported by the initial offender
nor any close substitutes in order to justify that the victim is not affected by the positive externality.
6In their Introduction Bagwell et al. (2007) predominantly refer to the terms of small and large countries in
order to motivate the analysis of the problem.
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assumptions on the sequential game. In section 4.3 we first derive each country’s valuation of
the retaliatory right. Subsequently, we derive the offender’s best response function and analyze
equilibrium behavior with respect to (i) country size, (ii) whether or not the offender may buy
the right, and (iii) the bargaining power distribution. Concluding remarks are offered in section
4.4.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Trading Environment
Our model includes three countries: A, B, and C. Let α denote the population of country A,
while β denotes the population of country B, and γ denotes the population of country C.
The representative consumer in country i derives utility from consumption of the goods a,
b, c, and z according to the quasilinear utility function
ui(a, b, c, z) := a− a
2
2
+ b− b
2
2
+ c− c
2
2
+ z, (4.1)
where i ∈ {A,B,C} and z is a freely traded numeraire good with price equal to one. The repre-
sentative consumer maximizes u(a, b, c, z) subject to its budget constraint. Since consumption
of good z features a constant ratio of marginal utility to price that is equal to unity, demand
for each non-numeraire good has to satisfy
∂ui
∂j
≥ pij , (4.2)
where j ∈ {a, b, c} and pij denotes the price of good j in country i. Consequently, the represen-
tative consumer’s demand for a non-numeraire good in each country is
dij(pij) = 1− pij . (4.3)
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Aggregated demand in country A, B and C is then given by
QAj(pAj) = α(1− pAj), (4.4)
QBj(pBj) = β(1− pBj), (4.5)
QCj(pCj) = γ(1− pCj) (4.6)
for each good j. Demand for the numeraire good z is determined residually.7
Assume that each consumer in each country is endowed with one unit of good z. Moreover,
let there be one unit of the country specific good in each country. Then supply in each country
can be characterized by a vector Si = (Sia, Sib, Sic, Siz). Accordingly, country A’s supply vector
is given by
SA := (1, 0, 0, α), (4.7)
country B’s supply vector is given by
SB := (0, 1, 0, β), (4.8)
and country C’s supply vector is given by
SC := (0, 0, 1, γ). (4.9)
Focusing our analysis on import tariffs, let τij denote country i’s per unit import tariff on foreign
good j. Furthermore let pj denote the world market price of good j. Then, market clearing
7Demand for the numeraire good in country i, Qiz, is obtained from the budget constraint: Qiz := Ii −∑
j∈{a,b,c}Qijpij , where Ii denotes the income of country i.
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conditions are given by
SAa = QAa(pa) +QBa(pa + τBa) +QCa(pa + τCa), (4.10)
SBb = QAb(pb + τAb) +QBb(pb) +QCb(pb + τCb), (4.11)
SCc = QAc(pc + τAc) +QBc(pc + τBc) +QCc(pc) (4.12)
for good a, b, and c respectively. Solving for prices yields the equilibrium world market price p̂j
for each good:8
p̂a =
α+ β + γ − 1− βτBa − γτCa
α+ β + γ
, (4.13)
p̂b =
α+ β + γ − 1− ατAb − γτCb
α+ β + γ
, (4.14)
p̂c =
α+ β + γ − 1− ατAc − βτBc
α+ β + γ
. (4.15)
Aggregated equilibrium demand Dij in country i for good j is obtained by substituting equilib-
rium prices p̂j (plus τij for imported goods) into aggregated demand functions Qij .
Figure 4.1 shows the described trading pattern between the three countries. Country i’s
gross equilibrium income Ii constitutes of (i) the sales revenues of its initial endowments and
(ii) its tariff revenues on the other two imported non-numeraire goods:
IA = SAap̂a + SAz +DAbτAb +DAcτAc, (4.16)
IB = SBbp̂b + SBz +DBaτBa +DBcτBc, (4.17)
IC = SCcp̂c + SCz +DCaτCa +DCbτCb. (4.18)
Now we can determine country i’s equilibrium demand for the numeraire good Diz as the residual
income after expenditures for all non-numeraire goods.
We use a country’s indirect utility function Vi as a measure of welfare. Hence, equilibrium
8Due to fix supplies in our model, we require that α+β+γ > 1 in order to obtain positive prices in equilibrium.
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Figure 4.1: Trading Pattern in the Three Country Model
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welfare of each country is a function of all three country size parameters and all six import
tariffs. Note that aggregated equilibrium demand for each good (i.e. Dij) has to be divided by
the country’s population parameter when it is substituted into the representative consumer’s
utility function ui. Multiplying this expression by the population parameter yields the aggregate
indirect utility functions in equilibrium:
VA(α, β, γ, τAb, τAc, τBa, τBc, τCa, τCb) := α uA(DAa/α,DAb/α,DAc/α,DAz/α), (4.19)
VB(α, β, γ, τAb, τAc, τBa, τBc, τCa, τCb) := β uB(DBa/β,DBb/β,DBc/β,DBz/β), (4.20)
VC(α, β, γ, τAb, τAc, τBa, τBc, τCa, τCb) := γ uC(DCa/γ,DCb/γ,DCc/γ,DCz/γ). (4.21)
4.2.2 Properties of the Model
In the following, we analyze country A’s welfare function and the welfare maximizing tariffs.
For the other two countries’ welfare functions the properties hold analogously.
An increase in τAb increases the domestic price pAb + τAb of good b in country A, which
results in a reduced demand for good b. This demand reduction is accompanied by a decrease
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in the world market price of good b.9 Thus, only a part of the increased import tariff on good
b is passed through to country A’s consumers. The other part is paid by country B, which now
receives a lower price for its exports. Despite this positive terms of trade effect, consumers’
surplus in country A decreases in the course of the higher domestic price for good b. Marginal
gains from the terms of trade effect are balanced against marginal losses of consumer surplus at
τ∗Ab, which denotes country A’s welfare maximizing import tariff on good b. τ
∗
Ab is a function of
country C’s import tariff on good b, τCb, and it is a function of the country size parameters α,
β, and γ, which determine the market share of country A. The explicit form is
τ∗Ab = τ
∗
Ab(α, β, γ, τCb) =
α(1 + γτCb)
(β + γ)(2α+ β + γ)
. (4.22)
Consider that the impact of τAb on the equilibrium world market price p̂b is determined by
Country A’s market share α/(α+ β+ γ). The larger country A’s market share, the higher is its
welfare maximizing import tariff. Therefore,
∂τ∗Ab
∂α
> 0,
∂τ∗Ab
∂β
< 0,
∂τ∗Ab
∂γ
< 0. (4.23)
Throughout this chapter we will only consider the tariffs τAb ∈ [0, τ∗Ab], τBa ∈ [0, τ∗Ba], and
τCb ∈ [0, τ∗Cb]. All other import tariffs are assumed to be zero and will be omitted in the
notation.
Thus, country A’s welfare is (i) increasing in A’s import tariff (positive terms of trade
effect), (ii) decreasing in any other country’s tariff on A’s exports (negative terms of trade
externality), and (iii) increasing in any other country’s tariff on A’s imports (positive terms of
trade externality):
∂VA
∂τAb
> 0,
∂VA
∂τBa
< 0,
∂VA
∂τCb
> 0. (4.24)
9Since the world market price is determined by aggregate demand, the decrease in the world market price is
lower than the increase of τAb so that the domestic price for good b is unambiguously increased.
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4.2.3 Order of Moves
We start from an initial free trade agreement, which is efficient in the sense that it maximizes
the countries’ joint welfare. Consider that in other settings where redistributive motivations
play a role, free trade does not necessarily have to be efficient. Moreover, we are aware that
those scholars who have the literature of Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001, and 2002) in mind
would probably dislike the assumption of a symmetric initial (free) trade agreement between
countries of asymmetric size. To the concerned reader we may suggest to imagine a symmetric
trade agreement with payments from smaller to larger countries. Consequently, what we label as
an initial offense of B against A would not turn out to become a realized offense. It would rather
constitute B’s threat point to extract payments from A. Hence, our analysis of the comparative
static transition from the status quo to a system of tradable retaliation could be seen as an
analysis of how threat points and the associated payments would change.10
We assume that countries set tariffs sequentially and under perfect information. First, we
allow country B, our “bad guy”, to choose whether or not he would like to violate the free trade
agreement by imposing an import tariff on good a. Subsequently, the injured country A receives
a (tradable) retaliatory right, which entitles its owner to impose an import tariff against country
B. Country A may now implement retaliation by itself or it may sell the right either to country
C, who then could impose an import tariff against country B, or it may sell the right to country
B.
Let us clarify that we only consider one initial offense by country B in the market for good a
and retaliatory action in the market for good b. Hence, the remainder of this chapter exclusively
10To see this more clearly, consider the following case. Let B be larger than A (i.e. β > α) and suppose both
countries have committed themselves to free trade. Furthermore let B’s net welfare gain from an offense against
A, which is B’s welfare gain from the offense minus its welfare loss due to A’s retaliation, be denoted as ∆V AB .
Thus, if ∆V AB > 0, A would have to pay an amount of ∆V
A
B to B in order to prevent B from committing the
offense. Due to the existence of a deadweight loss in our model, we already know that A would be willing to
pay this amount to B since the welfare loss that A would have to incur under the offense would be even larger.
Now consider what would happen if, due to introduction of tradable retaliation, the threat of retaliation against
B emerged from some other country C that is larger than A (i.e. γ > α). Clearly B’s net welfare gain from an
offense would deteriorate and so would the amount of money that A would have to pay to B in order to prevent
the latter from committing an offense.
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deals with the initially offensive tariff τBa and the retaliatory tariffs τAb and τCb. All other tariffs
may be assumed to equal zero.
Furthermore, we do not assume that the extent of authorized retaliation depends upon the
magnitude of the initial offense. We rather assume that the owner of the retaliatory right may
straight away set its welfare maximizing tariff τ∗Ab or τ
∗
Cb respectively. Although this assumption
may be at odds with reality in some cases, we find that our central results remain qualitatively
unchanged when we use simulations to calculate the authorized extent of retaliation according
to a counterfactual trade value model.11
4.3 Strategic Behavior
In this section we first derive all countries’ valuations for the retaliatory right before we turn to
the analysis of the offender’s best response.
4.3.1 Valuations
A natural property of our model is that any positive import tariff causes a deadweight loss.
That is, while the tariff setting country’s welfare may increase as well as the welfare of the third
country, which benefits from a lower world market price, global welfare decreases unambiguously.
Hence, speaking in absolute terms, the welfare loss of the country whose exports have been
subject to the tariff is always larger than the sum of both the tariff setting and the freeriding
country’s welfare gains. Thus we obtain the first lemma.
11Jordan (2005) discusses the various approaches that have been employed by WTO panelists to calculate the
extent of authorized retaliation. A popular approach has been the counterfactual trade value model. This model
first assesses the decrease in the trade value of the affected commodity due to the imposition of the illegal trade
measure. Subsequently, the panel would allow the victorious complainant to impose a retaliatory tariff up to
a level that would cause an equal reduction in the trade value of imports from the initial offender. However,
the interpretation of the Dispute Settlement Understanding’s Article 22, which constitutes the legal basis for
this equivalence condition, is quite controversial. Experts in the field of international trade law, such as John
Jackson, argue that if a country fails to comply with a ruling, retaliation may exceed the magnitude of the initial
offense in order to restore compliance from a legal point of view. In his paper titled “The Myth of ‘Rebalancing’
Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice”, Spamann (2006) shows that indeed panels often do not apply
the equivalence condition. Consider Appendix C.3 for a discussion of the changes that go along with the inclusion
of this feature in our model.
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Lemma 4.1. Country B’s valuation for the retaliatory right is higher than the sum of all other
countries’ valuations.
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Let V := VA + VB + VC . The deadweight loss ensures that
0 >
dV
dτij
=
dVA
dτij
+
dVB
dτij
+
dVC
dτij
(4.25)
For i ∈ {A,C}, we get dVAdτib > 0,
dVC
dτib
> 0 and dVBdτib < 0, hence
dVA
dτib
+ dVCdτib < |
dVB
dτib
|.
Since the offender has the highest valuation of the right, he will be able to pay the highest
price for it, so that he will finally buy the right whenever he is allowed to do so.
Now let us analyze those cases where the offender is excluded from the negotiation process.
Suppose country A received a retaliatory right from the WTO which authorizes the owner to
target country B’s exports with an import tariff. In order to answer the question whether
country A or country C or no one will execute the retaliatory right, it is useful to assess a
country’s welfare in each of the three possible negotiation outcomes.
Let V 0A denote country A’s welfare when no retaliation occurs. That is,
V 0A := VA|0. (4.26)
Let V rA denote country A’s welfare when country A carries out retaliation against country B.
That is,
V rA := VA|τ∗Ab . (4.27)
Finally, let V fA denote country A’s welfare, freeriding on country C’s retaliation against country
B:
V fA := VA|τ∗Cb . (4.28)
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Comparing the three different states of welfare, we find the next lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Country A and country C each prefer to execute retaliation themselves to no
retaliation. That is, V rA > V
0
A and V
r
C > V
0
C .
Proof of Lemma 4.2: We have τ∗ib > 0 and
∂Vi
∂τib
> 0 for i ∈ {A,C}.
Still maintaining the current assumption that the offender is excluded from negotiations, we
know from Lemma 4.2 that the final owner of the retaliatory right will use it. As a consequence,
the initial owner of the right, country A, has to choose whether he would like to execute the
right by himself, yielding V rA or if he prefers to have country C execute the right, yielding V
f
A .
Note that country C faces an analogous decision between its two states of welfare, V rC and V
f
C .
Given this binary decision, we define country A’s and country C’s willingness to pay for the
retaliatory right as
wpA := V rA − V fA , (4.29)
wpC := V rC − V fC . (4.30)
Furthermore let the difference between the willingness to pay of country A and country C be
denoted by
∆wp := wpA − wpC . (4.31)
For ∆wp we find the properties stated by the next lemma.
Lemma 4.3. The difference between country A’s and country C’s willingness to pay for the
retaliatory right, ∆wp,
(i) equals zero if α = γ and
(ii) is increasing in α.
Proof: See Appendix C.1.
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A noteworthy property of our model is that the willingness to pay for the retaliatory right
may be negative, both for country A and country C when the offender is not allowed to buy the
right and α and γ have about the same size. In those situations each country prefers the other
one to execute retaliation since the gain from freeriding is larger than the gain from carrying
out retaliation by oneself. However this does not affect the validity of Lemma 4.3 because
unlike Bagwell et al. (2007) we do not restrict the price of the retaliatory right to the set of
non-negative numbers. Note that a negative price is equivalent to offering the right at a price
of zero and attaching an envelope with a positive amount of money to the right. Consider that
there is always an amount of money, m, which the initial owner of the right, country A, would
be willing to attach to the offered right if wpA < 0. From Lemma 4.3 we know that for α < γ,
country C would always be willing to accept a package consisting of the retaliatory right and a
payment that is larger than |wpC |. Since wpA < wpC implies |wpA| > |wpC | in case of negative
valuations, A would always be willing to attach a sufficient amount of money |wpC | < m < |wpA|
that leads C to buy the right. In other words, even if both countries do not want to retaliate
by themselves, the smaller country has a higher willingness to pay for a free ride than the larger
country.12 This result can be explained by considering that the larger country can influence
the world market price of good b more effectively than the smaller country. Hence, the positive
terms of trade effect that benefits both A and C is larger when the larger country retaliates.
Corollary 4.1. Between country A and country C the retaliatory right is always allocated to
the larger one.
12To see this more clearly, consider the following case: Suppose A is smaller than C (i.e. α < γ) and both
countries prefer the other one to carry out retaliation (i.e. wpA < 0 and wpC < 0). According to our model, the
victim A is the initial owner of the retaliatory right. Since wpA is negative, A’s willingness to pay for carrying
out retaliation is negative. Note that this is equivalent to saying that A’s willingness to pay for a free ride on C’s
retaliation is −wpA, which is positive. Now consider that Lemma 4.3 states that α < γ implies wpA < wpC . This
is equivalent to −wpA > −wpC , which states that A’s willingness to pay for a free ride on C’s retaliation is larger
than C’s willingness to pay for a free ride on A’s retaliation. Hence A would be willing to offer a negative price
for the right of wpA (or to attach an amount of money m = −wpA to the right), while C would only be willing to
offer the higher negative price of wpC (or to attach a smaller amount of money m = −wpC). Alternatively, one
could view this process as two countries making bids for the public good ”free ride on my neighbor’s retaliation”.
Since the smaller country has the higher willingness to pay, it will receive the good. The larger country receives
the price for the good and carries out retaliation.
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4.3.2 The Initial Offense
In this section we assess the best response of the potentially offending country B. We start with
the analysis of a regime where B is not allowed to buy the retaliatory right. Subsequently, we
relax this assumption and allow B to join negotiations on the retaliatory right. Within the latter
setup we further distinguish between cases of high and low bargaining power of the offender and
between cases with and without side payments between A and C.
Excluding the Offender
Following the insight from Corollary 4.1, that the larger of country A and C will execute the
retaliatory right, we first examine B’s behavior for α > γ. Due to the symmetry of our model
we obtain analogous results for α < γ. Let α > γ and let country B’s net welfare gain from an
offense against country A, given country A retaliates by itself, be denoted by
∆V AB := VB|τ∗Ab,τ∗Ba − VB|0. (4.32)
For ∆V AB we find the properties stated by the next lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Country B’s net welfare gain from an offense against country A, given country A
retaliates by itself
(i) is decreasing in α and
(ii) is increasing in β.
Proof: See Appendix C.2.
Since the damage from retaliation does not depend on the initial offense and because utility
functions are separable in goods, we can state Lemma 4.5 which is the symmetric counterpart
to Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.5. For α < γ, country B’s net welfare gain from an offense against country A
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(i) is increasing in β and
(ii) is decreasing in γ.
Given the properties of Lemma 4.4, we may identify a set of country size parameters which
exactly balances country B’s gross welfare gain from the initial offense against its loss from the
execution of retaliation, so that its net gain equals zero. Formally, we set ∆V AB equal to zero
and solve for α, yielding
αIA(β, γ), (4.33)
which is country B’s indifference curve with respect to the decision of whether or not to commit
an offense against country A, given A retaliates by itself. Note that dαIAdβ > 0 follows from
Lemma 4.4, meaning that if the size of the offender increases, the victim country’s size has to
increase as well in order to restore the offender’s indifference.13
Elaborating on Lemma 4.5, we may set up an analogous indifference curve for country B,
which describes the set of country size parameters that renders country B indifferent between
whether or not to commit an offense against country A, given country C retaliates. This curve
is denoted by γIC(α, β), which exhibits analogous properties to αIA.
Finally, we can assemble the results from Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5 to characterize the
offender’s decision whether or not to offend in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Country B will commit an offense against country A if and only if one of
the following conditions is fulfilled:
(i) γ ≤ α < αIA(β, γ),
(ii) α < γ < γIC(α, β).
13Moreover, using simulation techniques, we find that dαIA
dγ
< 0. This implies that while γ increases, the
increase of VB |τ∗
Ab
− VB |0 is less strong than the decrease of VB |τ∗
Ba
− VB |0. In other words, as the size of the
third country C increases, B’s gross gain from offending erodes more than B’s damage from A’s retaliation does.
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Figure 4.2 visualizes the findings of Proposition 4.1 in the α-γ-space, holding β constant.
The dashed line with a slope of positive one separates the α-γ-space into a southeastern area
Figure 4.2: Equilibria - Offender Excluded
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B does offend ),( γβα IA
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where A executes retaliation and a northwestern area where C executes retaliation. Consider
first the area in which α > γ, where αIA(β, γ) separates the offensive regions from the non-
offensive regions. In line with the intuition of our earlier results, a potential offender of a given
size β would switch from not offending to offending as αIA(β, γ) is crossed from east to west,
that is as the victim’s size α is reduced.14
Now consider the northwestern area of Figure 4.2, in which α < γ and where γIC(α, β)
separates the offensive from the non-offensive regions. This area is just the mirror image of the
afore described southeastern area, which has been mirrored at the dashed line with slope one.
Furthermore, Figure 4.2 serves well to illustrate the comparative static effect of an intro-
14Our model exhibits a linear relationship between α and β as well as between γ and β. Particularly, α¯ =
0.867688β and γ¯ = 0.867688β. Hence, the coordinates of the intersection of the two indifference curves at I are
linear in β as well. In particular, at I we find α = γ = 0.663037β.
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duction of tradable retaliatory rights. As of today, tradable retaliation is fiction. So suppose
for a moment, our model was set up in today’s dispute settlement reality, that is, αIA(β, γ)
would solely determine whether B offended or not if we do not allow for the possibility of side
payments between A and B. In terms of Figure 4.2 this would mean that the whole parameter
space that stretches out to the west of αIA(β, γ) contained offensive equilibria. Returning to
fiction, we observe that this set of offensive equilibria is considerably reduced as the retaliatory
right is allocated to the most powerful country and γIC(α, β) comes into operation. Note that
the ability of tradable retaliation to improve a potential offender’s compliance is most powerful
when the victim is a small country. To see this, consider that the comparative static improve-
ment of compliance works whenever α < γ and that even within this area the set of offensive
equilibria, which disappears due to the introduction of tradable retaliation, is largest for small
α.
Including the Offender
In this subsection we show how equilibrium behavior changes when the offending country B is
allowed to buy the retaliatory right. We distinguish between two scenarios, the first one uses
the assumption that A and C cannot influence each other’s decision by side payments. In the
second scenario we relax this assumption.
The Case without Side Payments between Country A and C
If there are no side payments between country A and C, country B’s successful bid will have
to be higher than the larger country’s welfare gain from retaliation. Hence, B has to decide
whether or not it is profitable to reap the gain from its initial offense in sector a at the price of
paying another country at least the welfare gain forgone from retaliation in sector b. Another
way of asking the same question would be whether or not B’s welfare gain from playing τ∗Ba is at
least larger than the maximum of A’s and C’s welfare gain from playing τ∗Ab or τ
∗
Cb respectively.
Since markets for good a and good b are symmetric but separated from each other, the larger
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country always has the larger welfare gain from playing its welfare maximizing tariff. Thus,
under the additional assumption that B has maximum bargaining power, we obtain the next
proposition.
Proposition 4.2. If country B is allowed to bid, has maximum bargaining power and side
payments between country A and C are not allowed, country B will commit an offense against
country A if and only if β > max(α, γ).
However, while β > max(α, γ) constitutes a necessary condition for observing an offense of
B for any assumption on the distribution of bargaining powers, it only constitutes a sufficient
condition if B has maximum bargaining power. To understand this, consider that, due to the
deadweight loss, B’s valuation of the right is strictly higher than A’s or C’s valuation. Hence,
the price pinsp for which B buys the right must lie between the high price
p¯insp := VB|τ∗Ba −min{VB|τ∗Ab,τ∗Ba , VB|τ∗Ba,τ∗Cb}, (4.34)
which extracts B’s valuations completely and the low price
pinsp := max{VA|τ∗Ab,τ∗Ba − VA|τ∗Ba , VC |τ∗Ba,τ∗Cb − VC |τ∗Ba}, (4.35)
which falls short of B’s valuation. Note that p¯insp is just the welfare loss that B would suffer, if
retaliation was actually carried out. So if B’s bargaining power is at its minimum such that p¯insp
is realized, B’s indifference curves αnspIA (β, γ, pinsp) and γ
nsp
IC (α, β, pinsp) coincide with the ones of
the former regime where B is excluded from the negotiations, i.e. with αIA(β, γ) and γIC(α, β).
Finally, note that Proposition 4.2 implies that B’s indifference curves are independent of α
for all α < γ and independent of γ for all α > γ if and only if B has high bargaining power such
that pinsp is realized. If, to the contrary, B has lower bargaining power, a convex combination of
p¯insp and pinsp is realized, so that the indifference curves are dependent upon all three country
size parameters, just as under the regime where B is excluded.
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Allowing for Side Payments between Country A and C
If we include the possibility of side payments between A and C, then, even for high bargaining
power of B, the price pisp is dependent on the size of both country A and country C. To see this,
suppose for the moment that α was larger than γ, so that A and C agree that A should execute
retaliation rather than C. Then country C has a positive valuation for its gain from the reduced
world market price of good b. In other words, C would want to bribe A in order to prevent A
from selling the retaliatory right to B. As a consequence, B will have to afford a price that is
higher than the price in the previous scenario without side payments. Thus, the successful bid
of B has to be as least as high as the sum of both A’s welfare gain from retaliation and C’s
welfare gain from freeriding on the lower world market price of good b. From Lemma 4.1 we
know that there exists a range of prices that are smaller than B’s valuation and larger than the
sum of A’s and C’s valuation. Which price in this range will actually be realized depends again
upon the parties’ bargaining power. In the following, we just show the two extremes being (i)
a high price, p¯isp, equal to B’s valuation and (ii) a low price, pisp, equal to the sum of A’s and
C’s valuation.
First, assume for the moment, B had minimum bargaining power such that p¯isp is in place.
Then, the price that B would have to pay for its initial offense would be its full valuation of the
retaliatory right. But that is exactly as much as B would lose if it would not buy the retaliatory
right but rather suffer from executed retaliation. Hence, B’s indifference curves in the high
price scenario, αspIA(β, γ, p¯isp) and γ
sp
IC(α, β, p¯isp), coincide with its indifference curves when B is
foreclosed from bidding, i.e. with αIA(β, γ) and γIC(α, β) respectively.
Now assume to the contrary that B had maximum bargaining power, so that the low price,
pisp, was in place. Then B, would realize a welfare gain as compared to the afore analyzed high
price scenario. Consequently, B’s indifference curves αspIA(β, γ, pisp) and γ
sp
IC(α, β, pisp) would be
shifted outwards such that offending became profitable for even larger values of α and γ as
compared to the high price scenario. It may be summarized that for any given bargaining power
distribution, A and C are able to extract more of B’s valuation, thus rendering offenses less
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of Equilibria
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profitable for B, if they coordinate their interests by means of side payments as compared to
the case without side payments.
Comparison of Equilibria
The different assumptions on whether or not the offender may buy the right, whether or not side
payments between A and C may occur, and whether the offender has high or low bargaining
power entail different enforcement levels of the trade agreement. Consider Figure 4.3, which
displays the offensive regions under each of these regimes. The dark grey area, which is bordered
by αIA(β, γ) and γIC(α, β), displays the offensive regions under the regime where the offender
is excluded. Moreover, this region coincides with the offensive region under any regime with the
offender included, when the latter’s bargaining power is at its minimum. That is, αIA(β, γ) =
αspIA(β, γ, p¯isp) = α
nsp
IA (β, γ, p¯insp) and γIC(α, β) = γ
sp
IC(α, β, p¯isp) = γ
nsp
IC (α, β, p¯insp).
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However, this coincidence disappears as soon as we depart from the assumption of minimum
bargaining power for the offender. In line with intuition, compliance worsens and the offensive
region expands as the offender’s bargaining power becomes greater. This expansion is largest
under the assumption that A and C may not contract on side payments among each other. Under
this assumption an offense is profitable as soon as the offender is just an increment larger than
the retaliating country. Hence, we observe that the whole rectangular area to the southwest
of γnspIC and α
nsp
IA constitutes an offensive equilibrium for pinsp = pinsp. If we allow A and C
to contract on side payments, B will have to afford a higher price, even when its bargaining
power is at its maximum. As a consequence, the offensive area has to be smaller than in the
case without side payments but larger than in the case where B is excluded (or has minimum
bargaining power). Thus we observe that the region to the southwest of γspIC and α
sp
IA constitutes
an offensive equilibrium for pisp = pisp.
4.4 Discussion
The analysis of our model unambiguously suggests that compliance with the rules of the WTO
will be improved by the introduction of tradable retaliation when the offender is not allowed to
buy the retaliatory right. In line with intuition, we find that the compliance improvement comes
to play whenever a third country, C, is larger than the victim of the initial offense. Furthermore,
we find that the compliance improvement in this regime coincides with the one under any regime
in which the offender is allowed to buy the right but has minimum bargaining power.
However, the assumption that the country which is targeted by the retaliatory right is unable
to influence the decision of the owner of the right seems somewhat artificial. Even if it were
formally prohibited that the right was bought by the targeted country, the latter would still be
able to embark on private negotiations with the owner of the right. Thus, due to the deadweight
loss in our model, retaliation would never be carried out, but the targeted country would rather
pay the owner of the right to annul it, both in a world with and without tradable retaliation.
In light of these considerations we would be talking about a reallocation of threat points due to
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the introduction of tradable retaliation.
If one adopted this view, then even in those regimes where the offender is allowed to buy and
has high bargaining power, we still would observe an improvement of compliance as compared
to a status quo situation without tradable retaliation rights but with the possibility of transfer
payments between the offender and the owner of the right.
Moreover, maintaining the threat point view, we are able to state that global welfare would
improve under any regime of tradable retaliation since we would observe less initial offenses
while retaliation simply would not occur.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Results
In Chapter 2 a new approach, based on a statistical selection criterion and a comprehensive
data set, has been employed to investigate whether the usage of the DSS exhibits a bias against
smaller and poorer countries. Indeed, this method is able to detect such a bias. This result
parallels the empirical finding of Bown (2005) while it is contradictory to the conclusions that
are drawn by Horn et al. (1999) and Guzman and Simmons (2005) from their empirical results.
In Chapter 3 the comparative static analysis of a reduction in litigation costs has highlighted
a potential disadvantage of this measure. While less powerful countries’ compliance is improved,
some more powerful countries commit even more severe offenses than before. In particular, it has
been shown that if and only if the threat of the victim’s retaliation is greater than the offender’s
gain from an offense, a reduction in litigation costs can render the implementation of retaliation
profitable for the victim, and henceforth compliance can be improved. If, on the other hand, the
threat of the victim’s retaliation is sufficiently small in comparison to the offender’s gain from
an offense, then a reduction in litigation costs may lead countries to switch from minor offenses
to major offenses. This result underpins the insight that if one takes the rules of the DSS at face
value and leaves aside goodwill or reputational concerns, the WTO is a system of bilateral trade
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relations, where - in each of these pairings - each trading partner’s individual economic power
determines its threat point towards the other one. While the reduction of litigation costs does
improve a country’s incentive to file a complaint, it does not change the threat that emerges
from a particular country’s retaliation. Hence, the measure is unable to level out existing power
imbalances.
This insight is at the heart of the Mexican proposal of tradable retaliation, which has been
explored in Chapter 4. Once retaliation is allowed to be traded, the threat that is posed to the
offender is no longer solely dependent upon the victim’s retaliatory capacity. The model shows
that whenever there is a country that can utilize the retaliatory right more effectively against
the offender than the victim could, the threat of retaliation is improved as compared to the
status quo. Moreover, due to the deadweight loss property of the model, the offender has the
highest valuation of the right so that he will obtain and retire the right whenever he is allowed
to buy it.
5.2 Policy Implications
Given that there is evidence of a power-induced bias in the usage of the DSS,1 it remains to be
questioned whether this observation alone gives cause for concern.
From a normative perspective and in the light of the one-member-one-vote representational
concept of the WTO, one may be concerned by the insight that the current system favors
economically more powerful countries. However, as compared to a status of anarchy, where each
country sets its optimal tariff, the current system of costly and regulated retaliation actually
protects less powerful countries from more severe offenses of their more powerful trading partners.
At the same time, costly and regulated retaliation creates leeway for less powerful countries to
reap some gains from committing minor offenses against their more powerful trading partners
without facing the latter’s retaliation. That is, from a normative perspective, a reduction of
1Empirical evidence in support of a power-induced bias is provided by Bown (2005), Allee (2008), and Chapter
2 of this dissertation.
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litigation costs would be an undesirable measure since it would bring the system closer to the
status of anarchy, thus it would even amplify the WTO members’ potential to exploit existing
power imbalances.
As modeled in Chapter 3, a reduction of litigation costs has an ambiguous effect on global
welfare. That is while a cost reduction triggers more major offenses and more retaliation, it
reduces the magnitude of the remaining minor offenses. The first two effects reduce global
welfare while the latter effect increases global welfare. Whether the increasing or the decreasing
effects dominate, depends upon the distribution of the country specific parameter (e.g. the
political economy parameter or the population size parameter). If the vast majority of countries
exhibited a sufficiently similar country specific parameter, such that most bilateral parameter
ratios were close to unity, major offenses would never be profitable for these countries. Hence, a
reduction in litigation costs would mitigate the intensity of many minor offenses, while it would
lead only those few countries that exhibit a sufficiently higher parameter to committing major
offenses. Thus, global welfare would be improved. On the other hand, if the parameter was
distributed rather unevenly across countries, the welfare reducing increase in major offenses and
associated retaliation would be the dominating effect.
To conclude, the proposal of a reduction of litigation costs reveals serious flaws, regardless
of whether it is evaluated from a normative perspective or a perspective of global efficiency,
although the question of how to accomplish the cost reduction in the first place has not been
addressed at all.
As modeled in Chapter 4, the Mexican proposal of tradable retaliation has been found to
mitigate power imbalances whenever a third country values retaliation more than the victim of
the offense does. Thus, from a normative perspective, the introduction of tradable retaliation
succeeds in improving compliance with trade agreements that have been made with less powerful
countries. Even in those cases where the threat of retaliation is not sufficiently high in order
to induce compliance, the victim is able to extract a greater monetary compensation by selling
the retaliatory right. Moreover, even if the offender buys the right from the victim, the sales
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revenue that accrues to the victim is higher, the higher is any third country’s valuation of the
right. Hence, whether or not an increase in the retaliatory threat succeeds in deterring an
offense, the victim is strictly better off as compared to a system without tradable retaliation
whenever there is any other country that can use the retaliatory right more effectively.
Furthermore, global efficiency is unambiguously increased if the offender is allowed to buy the
retaliatory right because retaliation would never be carried out while less offenses, as compared
to the status quo, would occur.
Another merit of allowing the offender to buy the retaliatory right is that some countries
tend to restrict or discriminate against certain imports not because of an optimal tariff or
political economy incentive, but rather because of certain domestic legal provisions or customers’
preferences. Examples of such cases are the import restrictions of particular EC member states
targeting genetically modified food and agricultural products from the US and Canada, that
surfaced in the records of the WTO (2008) as DS291, DS292, and DS293. In another dispute
(DS26) the EC imposed import restrictions on meat from cattle, originating from the US, that
has been treated with hormones.2 Both of these import restrictions have been found to constitute
an infringement of the WTO’s rules. From an efficiency oriented perspective it would be desirable
to implement a system of tradable retaliation that allowed countries with special (offending)
preferences to live up to these without automatically triggering (welfare reducing) retaliation.
Allowing the offender to take the retaliatory right against him from the market, is nothing else
than asking him to pay for his preference.
All in all, the system of tradable retaliation in which the offender is allowed to buy the
retaliatory right leads to an increase in global welfare while it gives leeway for certain domestic
preferences and provisions.
However, when asking for the perspective that this proposal will ever be implemented, one
has to keep in mind that the introduction of tradable retaliation does not lead to a pareto welfare
improvement. While the less powerful countries benefit from higher compensation revenues and
2The files of the dispute DS26 are available in WTO (2008a).
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less offenses, the more powerful countries lose part of their ability to cash in on their power.
5.3 Future Research
Two avenues for further research come to mind.
First, the analysis of trade agreements and various policy proposals by experimental tech-
niques may help to verify the validity of the assumptions that are employed in theory. Usually
there is an array of assumptions, typically including rational behavior and perfect information,
that is at the heart of each theoretical study that seeks to explore the economics of tariff wars
and the enforcement of trade agreements. However, in reality it may as well be the case that e.g.
informational asymmetry has created a dispute that surfaced in the record of the WTO, which
would not have turned out to become a dispute under perfect information. Even a country’s
costly strategy to build a reputation as a tough complainant may be a best response under
asymmetric information in a repeated game framework. As of today, each “plausible” assump-
tion is equally justifiable since it is not possible to verify how well an assumption captures the
real environment. If data on test persons’ behavior were generated, economic theory may learn
about the performance of its models and consequently about the plausibility of the underlying
assumptions.
Second, in order to provide any political decision maker with a ready-to-use policy suggestion,
implementation issues have to be included in the analysis. That is, theoretical research has to go
one step further and address the question of how those desirable policy measures that increase
global welfare but do not lead to a pareto welfare improvement can be implemented.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Potential Nash equilibria (PNE) including “complain” are:
PNE1={(complain|don′t retaliate), (don′t comply)}
PNE2={(complain|don′t retaliate), (comply)}
PNE3={(complain|retaliate), (don′t comply)}
PNE4={(complain|retaliate), (comply)}
PNE1 does not not constitute an equilibrium since complaining and not retaliating is strictly
worse than not complaining when the the offender plays “don’t comply”.
PNE2 does not constitute an equilibrium since “comply” is not a best response to “don’t retal-
iate”.
PNE3 constitutes a Nash equilibrium iff Π > RO ∧RV > C.
PNE4 constitutes a Nash equilibrium iff Π ≤ RO ∧D > C.
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A.2 Included Disputes
The following list of numbers refers to the numbers of the disputes as filed in the records of the
WTO.
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 41,
44, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 84, 85, 87,
89, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 105, 109, 110, 112, 119, 121, 122, 123, 132, 134, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142,
143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 175,
177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 187, 189, 191, 195, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210,
211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 223, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 233, 235, 236, 238, 240,
241, 243, 244, 245, 247, 250, 255, 256, 257, 260, 262, 263, 264, 269, 270, 271, 272, 276, 277, 278,
280, 281, 286, 287, 288, 295, 296, 297, 299, 300, 302, 303, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313,
314, 319, 323, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 335
A.3 Consequences of Erroneous Selection of Victims
The decision rule on the selection of injured countries, which is stated in Assumption 2 focusses
on maintaining a low alpha error, i.e. on maintaining a low probability for the erroneous judge-
ment of an injured country as being a non-injured country. Clearly this is done at the cost
of a high beta error, which is the probability of erroneously judging a non-injured country as
being injured. Hence, the population of victims used for the regression is likely to contain a
significant share of countries that did not suffer from the disputable trade measure although
these WTO members shipped the particular commodity to the offender. In order to get an idea
about the consequences for the regression, it is useful to consider the distributional properties of
the regressors that are used in the probit model (i.e. DTV , GDPO, GDPV , GDPPCV , XOV ).
The following Table A.1 shows that these variables do not differ much between the subsample
of injured non-complaining countries on the one hand and the subsample of non-injured non-
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complaining countries on the other hand. Tests for common means of these variables accept
Subsample injured countries non-injured countries
Variable \ Variate mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
DTV 726,412,476 2,435,306,156 281,106,763 1,307,548,531
GDPO 6.61624E+12 3.49599E+12 6.36563E+12 3.89354E+12
GDPV 1.78587E+12 3.05519E+12 6.08896E+11 1.74028E+12
GDPPCV 11,600 11,922 11,782 11,505
XOV 26,907,460,940 46,921,528,954 11,811,431,088 28,543,606,898
Table A.1: Consequences of Erroneous Selection of Victims
the null hypothesis of a common mean on a 1% level. So it may be conjectured that there is
no systematic difference between injured and non-injured countries in the regressors, given a
country does not complain. Consequently, favoring a low alpha error while taking into account
a higher beta error, does not provoke a significant selection bias.
A.4 Robustness to Specification in Logarithms
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
C -3.159760*** -2.0897* 1.1998 -3-3650 -3.3622
log(GDPO) -0.1590*** -0.2005*** -0.2220*** -0.2188*** -0.2193***
log(GDPV ) 0.1687*** 0.1302*** 0.1296*** 0.1841*** 0.1841***
log(DTV ) 0.1127*** 0.1056*** 0.1063*** 0.1053*** 0.1053***
log(XOV ) 0.0568* 0.0792** 0.0840*** 0.0839***
log(EFV ) -0.7554*** 0.3798 0.3798
log(GDPPCV ) -0.2054*** -0.2054***
log(GDPPCO) 0.0010
McFadden R2 0.1813 0.1836 0.1887 0.1965 0.1965
Akaike 0.4635 0.4631 0.4610 0.4575 0.4583
Schwarz 0.4731 0.4751 0.4755 0.4743 0.4775
Hannan-Quinn 0.4670 0.4675 0.4663 0.4636 0.4653
Table A.2: Probit Results for the Augmented Model in Logs with Constant under Φcut4 (0.05)
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A.5 Robustness to Sample Selection Criteria
Variable\Criterion Φcut4 (0.05) Φcut4 (0.1) Φcut3 (0.05) Φcut3 (0.1)
log(GDPO) -0.2553*** -0.2545*** -0.2596*** -0.2587***
log(GDPV ) 0.0804*** 0.0802*** 0.0790*** 0.0803***
log(DTV ) 0.1078*** 0.1071*** 0.1090*** 0.1087***
log(XOV ) 0.0910*** 0.0913*** 0.0962*** 0.0945***
Akaike 0.4638 0.4743 0.4353 0.4465
Schwarz 0.4734 0.4841 0.4443 0.4558
Hannan-Quinn 0.4673 0.4779 0.4386 0.4499
Observations 2,409 2,338 2,599 2,506
Table A.3: Probit Results for Logarithmic Data under Various Sample Selection Criteria
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Properties of the Aggregated Welfare Functions
To show that a country’s welfare is concave in its own tariff it has to hold that:
(i)
∂V (τ, τ∗, n)
∂τ
> 0⇔ n(n− 4τ − 4nτ)
(2 + n)2
> 0
This condition is satisfied if the numerator is positive (i.e. if n(n−4τ−4nτ) > 0 holds). Solving
this expression for τ yields τ < n4+4n , which is Home’s optimal tariff τo.
(ii)
∂2V (τ, τ∗, n)
∂2τ
< 0⇔ −4n(1 + n)
(2 + n)2
< 0
This condition is always satisfied.
A country’s welfare is decreasing in the other country’s tariff if it holds that:
∂V (τ, τ∗, n)
∂τ∗
< 0⇔ 2τ
∗ − 1
9
< 0
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This condition is satisfied if it holds that τ∗ < 12 , where
1
2 is the prohibitive level of τ
∗, meaning
that the traded amount of good y would equal zero under such a high tariff.
B.2 Properties of the Lower Switching Point noi(c)
noi(c) is the country size ratio where the first mover switches from playing τo(n) to playing
τi(c, n). It is found by setting them equal to each other and solving for n. The polynomial has
only one positive real root. It takes on the value 1 for c = c¯ and the value 0 for c = c. The local
Taylor approximation of noi(c) at a particular value of c, with c ∈ [c, c¯), is strictly increasing in
c. In other words, locally (for n ∈ [0, 1) and c ∈ [c, c¯)) it holds that ∂noi(c)∂c > 0.
B.3 Properties of τ§(n) and Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof of Lemma 3.4: Aggregated welfare at Home in case of a major offense is given by:
V (τ, n) = V (τ,min{τ∗eq(τ, n), τ∗o }, n)
For the cases where the level of authorized retaliation has already reached τ∗o , the maximization
of V (τ, n) yields again Home’s optimal tariff τo(n) since τ∗o is independent of τ . Therefore the
optimal tariff remains unchanged, while welfare at Home is reduced by a fixed amount.
For the case of flexible retaliation (i.e. τ∗eq(τ, n) ≤ τ∗o ) Home’s welfare from a major offense
is:
V (τ, n) =
140 + 176n+ 35n2
72(2 + n)2
− 72n(2 + n)τ
2 − 3(2 + n)(12nτ +√25(2 + n)2 − 72n(2 + 3n)τ + 144n2τ2)
72(2 + n)2
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Taking the first derivative of V (τ, n) w.r.t. τ yields:
∂V (τ, n)
∂τ
=
3n((2 + 3n)− 4nτ)
2(2 + n)
√
25(2 + n)2 − 72n(2 + 3n)τ + 144n2τ2
− n(1 + 4τ)
√
25(2 + n)2 − 72n(2 + 3n)τ + 144n2τ2
2(2 + n)
√
25(2 + n)2 − 72n(2 + 3n)τ + 144n2τ2
Setting this expression equal to zero and solving for τ yields a polynomial of degree eight in
n. After having applied a Taylor Series expansion of degree four around the value n = 1, the
approximation of τ§(n) is given by τ§(n) =
(n−1)
15 − 17(n−1)
2
1125 +
817(n−1)3
84375 − 1679(n−1)
4
421875 The positive
real roots of the polynomial are n1 = 1 and n2 = 4.01578. Obviously it holds that τ§(n) = 0 at
n = 1.
∂τ§(n)
∂n is positive at n1 = 1 and negative at n2 = 4.01578. This means that τ§(n) is crossing
the zero line from below at n1 = 1 and from above at n2 = 4.01578. Hence τ§(n) must be
positive between unity and n2 and negative for values of n which are either smaller than unity
or larger than n2. Thus, Home prefers not to commit any major offense for all n ≤ 1.
B.4 Identifying the Area where V§(n) is preferred
First note that it has been shown in Appendix B.3 that τ§(n) will never be played if n ≤ 1.
Consequently the following proof can be restricted to the set of n ∈ (1, 4.01578).
The country size at the intersection of V§(n) and Vo(n) is found by subtracting V§(n) from
Vo(n), setting this difference equal to zero and solving for n. Since V§(n), and consequently the
difference between the two welfare functions, is a polynomial of degree eight, the regula falsi
method is employed to find the real and positive root of this expression.
At the fixed point of n = 1.40231, V§(n) and Vo(n) intersect. Since
∂Vo(n)
∂n >
∂V§(n)
∂n holds
locally at n = 1.40231, welfare from V§(n) will be higher (lower) than welfare from Vo(n) iff
n < 1.40231 (n > 1.40231) holds. Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for the first
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mover to prefer playing τ§(n) over τo(n) is that 1 < n < 1.40231 holds.
Given this necessary and sufficient condition holds, it still depends on the actual level of costs
whether Home prefers to play τ§(n) or τi(c, n) in this interval. The intersection of V§(n) and
Vi(c, n) at the point where n = 1.40231 can be solved for a cost level of c = 0.03086c¯. Speaking
graphically with regard to Figure 3.3, litigation costs have to be lower than 0.03086c¯ to shift
the Vi(c, n)-curve so much downward that its intercept with the V§(n)-curve lies in the interval
of 1 < n < 1.40231. Therefore, a necessary condition for the first mover to prefer playing τ§(n)
over τi(c, n) is c ∈ [c, 0.03086c¯).
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Let nio(c) denote the market size ratio where the first mover switches
from playing τi(c, n) to playing τo(n). Hence it is the intersection of Vo(n) and Vi(c, n) in the
n-V -space, where Vi(c, n) crosses Vo(n) from above (You may want to consider Figure 3.3.). It
is found by setting the two corresponding welfare functions equal to each other and solving for
n:1
Vo(n) = Vi(c, n)
⇔
(17+25n)
64(1+n) =
1
18(5 +
1
4(2+n)2
(3(−12− 6n+√α)(1 + 112n((1 + n)(12 + 18n−
√
α)))))
The resulting polynomial has eight roots in n, meaning that there are eight intersections of Vo(n)
and Vi(c, n). Four of them are complex, and four are real. The only root that is positive and
real for n > 1 (Two other real roots are globally negative. Another real root is positive, but
globally smaller than unity.2) is therefore nio(c). It takes on the value 2.46187 at c¯ and the value
1.38504 at c. The local Taylor approximation of nio(c) at a particular value of c, with c ∈ [c, c¯),
is strictly increasing in c. In other words, locally (for n ∈ (1.38504, 2.46187) and c ∈ [c, c¯)) it
1Where α = 18(4 + n(20 + 17n)) + 18(2 + n)2
√
1− 144c− (2 + n)2144c.
2This positive real root, being smaller than unity, coincides with the lower switching point noi(c). This is due
to the fact that welfare from both playing τo(n) and playing τi(c, n) always has to coincide in noi(c) because the
associated tariffs themselves are identical, and both do not trigger any retaliation at noi(c).
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holds that ∂nio(c)∂c > 0.
B.6 Properties of Vo(n)
Substituting Home’s optimal tariff into its welfare function yields:
Vo(n) := V (τo(n), τ∗o , n)
In explicit terms the function reads:
Vo(n) =
17 + 25n
64 + 64n
The first and second derivatives w.r.t. n are given by:
∂Vo(n)
∂n
=
1
8(1 + n)2
,
∂2Vo(n)
∂2n
= − 1
4(1 + n)2
B.7 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Let nio(np) denote the country size ratio, where the first mover switches
from playing τi(np, n) to playing τo(n). Hence nio(np) is the equation for the value of n at the
intersection of Vo(n) := V (τo(n), τ∗o (n), n) and Vi(np, n) := V (τi(np, n), 0, n) as a function of np.
This function is found by setting Vo(n) equal to Vi(np, n) and solving for n:3
Vo(n) = Vi(np, n)
⇔
4+45n+30n2+5n3
8(1+n)(3+n)2
= 1
2(2+n)2
(1 + 4n+ n2 + n((3+n)(2+3n)−β)2(3+n) − (1+n)((3+n)(2+3n)−β)
2
4n(3+n)2
)
For the case of prohibitive costs (i.e. np = n), it holds that nio(np) = 1.60254. Hence any Home
country of larger size than 1.60254 would play τo(n). In the other extreme case of no litigation
3Where β =
√
4 + n(100 + n(149 + 66n+ 9n2))− 8(2+n)2(3+n)
(2+np)2(3+4np+n2p)
+ 8(2 + n)2
√
1− (1+n)(2+n)2(3+n)
(2+np)2(3+4np+n2p)
.
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costs (i.e. np → ∞), nio(np) converges to 1.21280. Between these boundaries, the local Taylor
approximation of nio(np) exhibits the following properties:
1. ∂nio(np)∂np > 0 for all n > 1.52790
2. ∂nio(np)∂np = 0 for all n = 1.52790
3. ∂nio(np)∂np < 0 for all n < 1.52790
B.8 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.3: (i) Let c˜ ∈ (c, c¯) and ω˜ ∈ (ω0, ω¯] denote the pair of c and ω that
establishes the equality VM = V m. From Lemma 3.5, stating that dV
m
dc > 0, it follows
that first, VM > V m for all c ∈ [c, c˜) and given ω˜ and second, VM < V m for all c ∈ (c˜, c¯)
and given ω˜.
(ii) For the subset ω ∈ [ω, ω0), it holds that VM < V m for all feasible values of c (i.e. c ∈ [c, c¯)).
Hence, a country will always choose a minor offense in this subset of ω.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Proof of Lemma 4.3: (i) Utility is separable in goods. Therefore the gain from retaliating and
freeriding can be analyzed without considering the initial offence, that is
VA|τ∗Ab,τ∗Ba − VA|τ∗Ba = VA|τ∗Ab − VA|0 (C.1)
and
VA|τ∗Ba,τ∗Cb − VA|τ∗Ba = VA|τ∗Cb − VA|0. (C.2)
Hence
wpA = VA|τ∗Ab,τ∗Ba − VA|τ∗Ba,τ∗Cb = VA|τ∗Ab − VA|τ∗Cb , (C.3)
which equals wpC if α = γ.
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(ii) Let α > γ. We have
∆wp = VA|τ∗Ab − VA|τ∗Cb − (VC |τ∗Cb − VC |τ∗Ab) (C.4)
= VA|τ∗Ab − VC |τ∗Cb − (VA|τ∗Cb − VC |τ∗Ab) (C.5)
= VA|τ∗Ab − VA|0 − (VC |τ∗Cb − VC |0)− (VA|τ∗Cb − VA|0 − (VC |τ∗Ab − VC |0)). (C.6)
Since α > γ, A’s demand for good b is more price elastic than C’s demand for good b. Hence
A’s welfare gain from setting τ∗Ab is larger than C’s welfare from setting τ
∗
Cb. Thus, we have
VA|τ∗Ab − VA|0 − (VC |τ∗Cb − VC |0) > 0. From α > γ we have τ∗Ab > τ∗Cb. So the world market
price for good b is lower under τ∗Ab than under τ
∗
Cb. Thus, VA|τ∗Cb−VA|0−(VC |τ∗Ab−VC |0) < 0.
Consequently, for α > γ we get ∆wp > 0 and vice versa.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Proof of Lemma 4.4: Since the utility function is separable in goods we may write
∆V AB = VB|τ∗Ab,τ∗Ba − VB|0 (C.7)
= VB|τ∗Ab − VB|0 + VB|τ∗Ba − VB|0. (C.8)
(i) Consider VB|τ∗Ab − VB|0, which is B’s welfare loss when A imposes a tariff against B. As
α increases, A’s import demand for good b is getting more price elastic. Hence, the share
of the deadweight loss, which is associated with the setting of a tariff τAb, that A has to
bear, decreases while B’s share of the deadweight loss increases. Consequently, we find
that VB|τ∗Ab − VB|0 is decreasing in α.
Consider VB|τ∗Ba − VB|0, which is B’s welfare gain from setting a tariff against A. As
α increases, A’s export supply of a, which is just the fixed supply SAa minus domestic
demand, is getting more price elastic. This in turn renders worldmarket supply of good a
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more price elastic. Hence, the share of the deadweight loss, due to the setting of a tariff
τBa, that accrues to B increases. Consequently, we find that VB|τ∗Ba − VB|0 is decreasing
in α, so ∆V AB is decreasing in α.
(ii) Consider VB|τ∗Ab − VB|0, which is B’s welfare loss when A imposes a tariff against B. As β
increases, B’s export supply of good b, which is just the fixed supply SBb minus domestic
demand, is getting more price elastic. This in turn renders worldmarket supply of good b
more price elastic. Hence, the share of the deadweight loss, which is associated with the
setting of a tariff τAb, that B has to bear decreases. Consequently we find that VB|τ∗Ab−VB|0
is increasing in β.
Consider VB|τ∗Ba − VB|0, which is B’s welfare gain from setting a tariff against A. As β
increases, B’s import demand for good a is getting more price elastic. Hence, the share
of the deadweight loss, due to the setting of a tariff τBa, that accrues to B decreases.
Consequently we find that VB|τ∗Ba − VB|0 is increasing in β, so ∆V AB is increasing in β.
C.3 Consequences of Including the WTO’s Equivalence Condi-
tion
Let the trade value of good b that is imported into country A be denoted by TVAb := DAbp̂b, and
let the trade value of good a that is imported into country B be denoted by TVBa := DBap̂a.
Given an initial free trade agreement let the change in TVBa due to the setting of a positive
import tariff τBa be denoted by ∆TVBa := TVBa|0 − TVBa|τBa>0. The change in TVAb due to
the setting of a positive tariff τAb is defined analogously as ∆TVAb := TVAb|0 − TVAb|τAb>0.
With B as our initial offender, the interpretation of the WTO’s equivalence condition by
means of a counterfactual trade value model would require that A’s retaliation against B caused
a trade value distortion in sector b that must not exceed the initial trade value distortion in
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sector a. That is
∆TVAb ≤ ∆TVBa. (C.9)
Solving this condition for τAb yields τ
eq
Ab which is A’s tariff that exactly re-balances the trade
value distortion according to this interpretation of the equivalence condition.1
Up to now, B’s best response tariff has been either a tariff of zero or its optimal tariff τ∗Ba.
With the introduction of τ eqAb and τ
eq
Cb as a restriction on A’s and C’s retaliation, B will take
this endogenous reaction into account when choosing its best response. For certain parameter
values we find that a third tariff τ §Ba maximizes B’s welfare.
Let V eqB := VB|τeqAb,τBa denote B’s welfare when A’s retaliation is a function of B’s initial
offense according WTO’s equivalence condition. Then τ §Ba is the tariff that maximizes V
eq
B .
Economically, τ §Ba balances B’s marginal gain from an incremental tariff increase of τBa against
the marginal loss that is caused via the associated increase of τ eqAb. Substituting τ
§
Ba into V
eq
B
yields V §B := VB|τeqAb,τ§Ba , which is B’s maximized welfare from an offense against A, given A
retaliates elastically according to the WTO’s equivalence condition. In line with economic
intuition, we find that the marginal gain from offending is only larger than the marginal loss
from retaliation if and only if the offender is larger than the retaliating country. So α/β = 12
constitutes an upper bound to the size ratio between retaliator and offender where τ §Ba can be
a best response. For larger values of α/β, offending is strictly dominated by playing a tariff of
zero. Furthermore, for small values of α/β there exists a critical lower bound κ > 0, which is a
function of γ, at which B is indifferent between playing τ∗Ba and τ
§
Ba.
3
Hence, the inclusion of the equivalence condition affects our results as follows.
(i) For α ≥ β the inclusion of the equivalence condition has no effect since playing τ §Ba is
1Note that C’s maximum admissible retaliatory tariff τeqCb is obtained by similar means.
2In case C retaliates the condition is γ/β = 1
3Of course it holds that κ as the lower bound is smaller than the upper bound of α/β = 1. For the two country
case (i.e. γ = 0) we find that κ = 0.86147β is slightly smaller than α¯ = 0.867688β. In case C is the one who
retaliates, we find a critical γ/β ratio.
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dominated by setting a tariff of zero when the offender is smaller than the retaliating
country.
(ii) For α < κβ, the inclusion of the equivalence condition has no effect since for B playing
τ §Ba is dominated by setting its optimal tariff τ
∗
Ba when the retaliator is sufficiently smaller
than the offender (i.e. α/β < κ).
(iii) For κβ ≤ α < β the inclusion of the equivalence condition renders τ §Ba a best response for
B.
Consider Figure C.1 to see the effects of an introduction of the equivalence condition into the
scenario, where the offender is not allowed to buy the right.
Figure C.1: Equilibria under the Equivalence Condition
α
γ
IAα
ICγ
§*I
γα <
γα >
α
γ
β
κβ
κβ
β
)0,,( ** AbAb ττ
),,0( ** CbBa ττ )0,0,0(
)0,0,0(
)0,,( §AbeqAb ττ
),,0( § eqCbAb ττ
I
0§I
The white outer areas, where no offense occurs, are not affected. The dark grey inner area,
where offender and retaliator both play their optimal tariff, remains unchanged as well. However,
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the striped area, which depicts those cases where B now plays τ §Ba while A or C retaliate with
τ eqAb or τ
eq
Cb respectively, stretches from just below α = β and γ = β down to α = κβ and γ = κβ.
Note that κβ < α¯ and κβ < γ¯, such that even some of the former τ∗-τ∗-equilibria turn into
τ eq-τ §-equilibria.
This new area of equilibria basically represents an intermediate case between peace and the
trade war with the τ∗-τ∗-equilibria. In line with intuition, this new area shows up when the
opponents are of similar size, but the offender still has a small size advantage making it profitable
for him to commit a small offense.
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